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jurisdictional Statement 
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of UDOT. The order was certified as final under rule 54(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the order is at Addendum A. This 
court has jurisdiction under Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
Statement of the Issue 
Schroeder Investments, L.C. filed a condemnation action to widen an 
easement for the construction of a public road to access a storage facility 
Schroeder intends to build on its adjacent parcel. At the time Schroeder filed its 
action, the property subject to the easement was owned by Clyde and Linda 
Edwards. During the lawsuit, UDOT purchased the property and defended 
against the condemnation action on the ground that it planned to use the 
property for a drainage ditch and detention pond, a public use UDOT claimed 
was more necessary than Schroeder's planned public road. 
Schroeder argued that the court need not compare the relative necessity of 
the two proposed uses because they are compatible under Utah's compatible use 
doctrine, i.e., the road and the pond may be built alongside each other on the 
property. When UDOT claimed that the detention pond would extend over the 
easement, Schroeder offered to give UDOT a portion of its adjacent parcel to 
permit the construction of a modified detention pond, thereby allowing both 
public uses and maximizing the public use of the property. 
1 
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In the district court, UDOT conceded that it could modify its detention 
pond to accommodate Schroeder's use without compromising UDOT's use or 
incurring additional expense: "that won't cost, it won't delay, we can 
accomplish this/' (R.T.1 687:30.) UDOT instead argued that (i) the compatible use 
doctrine applied only if Schroeder's planned use is the same as UDOTs use, i.e., 
a detention pond; and (ii) UDOT need not do anything to make the uses 
compatible, even if Schroeder offered to compensate any related expenses. The 
district court agreed with UDOT and entered judgment in favor of UDOT. 
Issue I: Whether the district court erred in interpreting Utah's compatible 
use doctrine when it declared that two uses for real property are not compatible 
after the parties stipulated that altering their uses was feasible and would make 
them compatible, and the condemning party offered to compensate the other 
party for any expenses associated with alterations. 
Standard of Review: A district court's interpretation of a common law 
doctrine is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Ellis v. Estate of 
Ellis, 2007 UT 77f 1 6,169 P.3d 441; see also Statev.Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 
(Utah 1997) ("A lower court's interpretation of binding case law presents a 
question of law which we review for correctness."). While the district court 
entered summary judgment in favor of UDOT, it also made findings of fact after 
a hearing on the motion at which the parties proffered testimony. (R.T. 687.) 
1
 "R.T." refers to the transcripts that are part of the record on appeal. 
i 
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Those findings are not at issue on appeal. First, the findings of fact are not 
relevant because the district court applied the incorrect legal standard. (R.T. 
687:41.) Second, UDOT conceded that its detention pond could be altered 
without compromising its proposed use and that Schroeder offered to 
compensate UDOT for any expenses related to repositioning its pond. (R.T. 
687:30.) For that reason, the opening brief presents a pure legal question of 
whether Utah's compatible use doctrine applies in light of UDOT's concessions.2 
Preservation: The summary judgment proceedings in the district court 
focused on the scope and application of Utah's compatible use doctrine. (R.T. 
687:4, 27-30,40-42.) Thus, Schroeder preserved the issue of whether Schroeder's 
use of the property is compatible with UDOTs use. 
Determinative Provisions 
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B: 
Utah Const, art. I, § 22 
Utah Code § 78B-6-501 to -504 
The following cases are at Addendum C: 
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 
172 (Utah 1918); 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735 
(Utah 1901) 
2
 Schroeder does not concede that findings of fact were appropriate in 
adjudicating UDOTs motion for summary judgment. While the parties 
proffered evidence at the hearing, Schroeder never agreed to convert the hearing 
into a bench trial. But it makes no difference. For the same reason the findings 
of fact are irrelevant, the evidence the district court failed to construe in the light 
most favorable to Schroeder is irrelevant. 
a 
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Statement of the Case 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
Schroeder filed a condemnation action seeking to widen an easement to 
construct a public road to a storage facility to be built on its adjacent parcel. 
(R. 1-8.) UDOT moved for summary judgment on the ground that UDOT's use 
of the property —a drainage ditch and detention pond next to 1-15 for a highway 
project—was the "more necessary public use." (R. 352.) 
Schroeder opposed UDOTs motion on the ground that the "more 
necessary public use" doctrine is inapplicable because the two uses are 
compatible or easily could be made compatible. (R. 385; R.T. 687:27-29.) To 
ensure the uses were compatible, Schroeder offered to give UDOT some adjacent 
land so that the public road and the detention pond could coexist and not 
overlap. (R.T. 687:22-23.) UDOT refused, even though it conceded that, with the 
adjacent land, it could build its detention pond without any additional cost to 
UDOT: "that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this." (R.T. 687:30.) 
The district court ruled that the two uses were incompatible because they 
were of different kinds —i.e., a detention pond and public road. (R. 635.) The 
court rejected Schroeder's argument that the compatible use doctrine applies 
when the uses are of different kinds, especially where the condemning party 
compensates for expenses related to making the uses compatible. (R. 631-32.) 
Schroeder appeals from summary judgment in favor of UDOT. 
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II. Statement of Facts 
Schroeder owns a parcel of land near Provo, Utah, that borders 1-15. (R. 7.) 
Schroeder's parcel is currently vacant, but zoned for development. (R. 634.) 
Schroeder plans to build a storage facility on its parcel. (Id.) 
Clyde and Linda Edwards owned real property adjacent and to the north 
of Schroeder's parcel.3 (R. 7, 634.) Schroeder currently has a 16.5 foot easement 
across the property and uses this easement to access its parcel. (R. 634.) As 
Schroeder moved forward with its plans to build the storage facility, it learned 
that Provo City requires public roads to be 24 feet wide to allow vehicles to travel 
safely. (R. 156.) To comply with that requirement, Schroeder needed to widen 
its easement by 9.5 feet. (R. 155-56.) Schroeder attempted to negotiate with the 
Edwards to purchase the additional land to widen the easement. (R. 156.) When 
negotiations failed, Schroeder filed an action to condemn the additional 9.5 feet 
needed to widen the easement. (Id.) 
After Schroeder filed its condemnation action, the Edwards conveyed the 
property to UDOT. (R. 633.) UDOT planned to use this land for a drainage ditch 
and detention pond to retain and control highway water runoff as part of its 
Interstate 15 "CORE" highway construction project. (Id.) 
Once UDOT became a defendant in Schroeder's condemnation action, it 
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the condemnation claim fails 
as a matter of law because UDOT's use— the detention pond—is a "more 
3
 A map showing the relation of the parties/r properties is at Addendum D. 
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necessary public use" than Schroeder's public road. (R. 345-52.) Schroeder 
argued that the "more necessary public use" requirement does not apply because 
the two uses are compatible. (R.T. 687:27-29.) Under the compatible use 
doctrine, when property can reasonably accommodate two public uses, a court 
must permit both uses. (R.T. 687:28-29.) Schroeder argued that with feasible 
alterations, UDOT's use would be compatible with Schroeder's use.4 
The district court held a hearing on UDOT's motion for summary 
judgment. (R.T. 687.) UDOT conceded that "[t]here is no question" it would be 
"feasible" for Schroeder's road to coexist with UDOT's detention pond. (R.T. 
687:30.) UDOT also represented to the court that accommodating Schroeder's 
use would not result in many additional costs. (Id.) Despite those concessions, 
UDOT argued that Schroeder's use was incompatible with UDOT's use because 
Schroeder's use was different in kind, was not as important, and was "contingent 
upon extra events happening." (Id.) 
The district court granted UDOT's motion for summary judgment. First, 
the court concluded that, even though UDOT acquired the property from the 
Edwards during the condemnation action, UDOT's "intended use commenced 
with the transfer of title" from the Edwards to UDOT, and, therefore, UDOT had 
"already appropriated" the property. (R. 631-32.) 
4
 Schroeder also requested to conduct additional discovery under Rule 56(f) to 
determine whether and how the two uses were compatible. The district court 
allowed that discovery, considered much of the additional evidence gathered, 
and made findings of fact in granting summary judgment. (R. 632-35.) 
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Second, the district court concluded that when "property is already 
appropriated to some public use/ ' another proposed use of the property must be 
for a "more necessary public use" and Schroeder's use of a public road was not 
more necessary than UDOT's public highway project. (R. 631.) 
Third, the district court ruled that Utah's compatible use doctrine applies 
only where: (i) the condemnor and the condemnee propose the same use for the 
property; and (ii) "the prior use is not dispossessed or deprived." (R. 631.) 
Finally, although the court recognized that it may be "feasible" for the 
property to be used to benefit the public as both a public road and detention 
pond, the court nonetheless ruled that the uses are incompatible: "Schroeder's 
proposal is not compatible with the intended and designed UDOT use," and as 
such, it "does not fall within the compatible use doctrine as adopted by the Utah 
court." (R.631.) 
The district court's order was certified as final under rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and Schroeder filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 630, 
671.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
Schroeder filed a condemnation action to widen an easement for the 
construction of a public road across property owned by Clyde and Linda 
Edwards. After Schroeder filed this lawsuit, UDOT purchased the property and 
defended against condemnation on the ground that it planned to use the 
property for a drainage ditch and detention pond, a use UDOT claimed was 
more necessary than Schroeder's public road. 
In Utah, a party seeking to condemn land for a public use must satisfy four 
statutory criteria: (i) the proposed use must be authorized by law; (ii) the taking 
must be "necessary" for that use; (iii) the construction and use must "commence 
within a reasonable time" after initiation of the condemnation proceeding; and 
(iv) "if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to 
be applied is a more necessary public use." Utah Code § 78B-6-504. Here, only 
the fourth element—the "more necessary public use" requirement—is at issue. 
This appeal centers upon whether the "more necessary public use" 
requirement applies. An exception to that requirement is known as the 
"compatible use" doctrine. Under the compatible use doctrine, the relative 
necessity of the uses is irrelevant if (i) the uses can be made compatible without 
destroying the existing use and (ii) the condemnor pays expenses related to any 
modifications needed to make the uses compatible. Monetaire Mining Co. v. 
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Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172,177 (Utah 1918); Postal Tel. Cable 
Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735, 739 (Utah 1901). 
The district court erred in defining the scope of the compatible use 
doctrine and in applying that doctrine in light of the following two undisputed 
facts: (i) UDOT conceded that with a few alterations, the detention pond could 
coexist with Schroeder's public road (R.T. 687:30); and (ii) Schroeder was willing 
to compensate UDOT for any associated expenses. (R.T. 687: 30,32.) In light of 
UDOT's concession and Schroeder's offer to provide just compensation, the 
district court erred in two ways in ruling that the uses are not compatible. 
First, the district court erred in ruling that two uses are not compatible 
unless they are of the same kind. In making that ruling, the district court relied 
on a 1918 Utah Supreme Court case that happened to involve uses of the same 
kind—sharing a mining tunnel. Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 172-74. But 
other cases make clear that the compatible use doctrine applies where the uses 
are of different kinds. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 736, 739 (a telegraph and a 
railroad). 
Second, the district court erred in ruling that anything less than full 
compatibility foreclosed condemnation. Under the compatible use doctrine, a 
landowner may be required to alter an existing use to accommodate a second 
public use, especially when the condemning party compensates the landowner 
for resulting expenses. Id. at 739-40 (allowing telegraph to construct line so long 
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as it compensated railroad); Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 174 (with a few 
"arrangements" it would be "feasible and practicable" to accommodate both 
uses).. Here, UDOT conceded that the alterations were feasible, and Schroeder 
agreed to compensate UDOT for any expenses. (R.T. 687:30,32.) Under those 
circumstances, the uses are "compatible" and the public should have the benefit 
of both public uses. 
This court should vacate the judgment and remand to permit the court to 
apply the correct legal standard in determining whether the uses are compatible. 
Argument 
Under Utah's compatible use doctrine, if two uses can stand together, 
"they must so stand." Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 
67 P. 672, 677 (Utah 1902). Here, UDOTs use is a drainage ditch and detention 
pond, and Schroeder's use is a public road leading to Schroeder's adjacent parcel. 
After Schroeder filed its condemnation action, UDOT purchased the 
subject property and claimed that UDOTs use—the detention pond—would be 
in the same location as the public road. But that is insufficient to demonstrate 
incompatibility under the compatible use doctrine, especially in light of UDOTs 
concession that it is feasible to alter the detention pond to make the two uses 
compatible, and Schroeder's agreement to compensate UDOT for expenses 
associated with any necessary alterations. 
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In light of UDOTs concessions, the only issue on appeal is whether Utah's 
compatible use doctrine applies where uses easily can be altered to be 
compatible. It does. Below, Schroeder first will describe the origin and 
development of the compatible use doctrine as a necessary implication of the 
"more necessary public use" requirement in the eminent domain statute. Utah 
Code § 78B-6-504. Schroeder then will explain how the district court's narrow 
interpretation of "compatible use" is inconsistent with Utah law. Schroeder then 
will demonstrate that the uses are compatible in light of UDOTs concessions. 
This court should vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to 
determine whether the uses are compatible under the correct legal standard. 
I. The Origin and Development of Utah's Compatible Use Doctrine 
For more than a century,5 a party seeking to condemn land for a public 
purpose must satisfy four statutory criteria. Utah Code § 78B-6-504. First, "the 
use to which it is to be applied" must be "a use authorized by law." Id. § 78B-6-
504(1)(a). Second, the taking must be "necessary" for that use. Id. § 78B-6-
5
 Copies of the Utah statutes attached at Addendum E demonstrate that the 
statutory provision relevant here has not changed materially since 1888. Utah 
Code § 78-34-3(3), -4(3) (1953) (Private property may be "appropriated to public 
use; provided, that such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary 
public use than that to which it has been already appropriated;" and "[i]f already 
appropriated to some public use, that the public use to which it is to be applied is 
a more necessary public use."); Utah Code § 104-34-3(3), -4(3) (1951) (same); Utah 
Rev. Stat. § 104-61-3(3), -4(3) (1943) (same); Utah Code § 104-61-3(3), -4(3) (1933) 
(same); 1917 Utah Laws §§ 7332(3), 7333(3) (same); 1888 Utah Laws §§ 3843. s 
1107(3), 3844. s 1108(3) (same). 
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504(1)(b). Third, the construction and use of the property must "commence 
within a reasonable time" after the initiation of the condemnation proceeding. 
Id. § 78B-6-504(l)(c). And fourth, "if already appropriated to some public use, 
the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use." Id. 
§ 78B-6-504(l)(d). In the proceedings before the district court, only the fourth 
element was at issue. (R. 632-35.) 
The "more necessary public use" requirement—sometimes referred to as 
the "prior public use" rule—is common to most eminent domain statutes 
throughout the nation. Although courts have cited various rationales for the 
requirement, the two most common are: (i) in delegating eminent domain power 
to municipal or private corporations, the legislature could not have intended 
"that the public use of one be subject to destruction, through condemnation, by 
the public use of another, because both uses have been authorized by the 
sovereign;"6 and (ii) applying the more necessary public use requirement 
prevents circular, recriminatory, or serial condemnations.7 
6
 Mark S. Arena, The Accommodation of 'Occupation' and "Social Utility" in Prior 
Public Use Turisprudence, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 233, 237-38 (1988); see also Hiland v. 
Ives, 228 A.2d 502, 505 (Conn. 1967) ("[I]t is not to be assumed, in the absence of 
a clear intention expressed or necessarily to be implied, that the sovereign, in 
delegating the power of eminent domain to a private or municipal corporation, 
intended to give the power to destroy a preexisting public use. But for this rule of 
statutory interpretation, one public use would be subject to destruction for 
another such use, even though the use of condemnor and that of condemnee had 
each been authorized by the sovereign."). 
7
 See, e.g., Denver Power & Irrigation Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R.R. Co., 30 
Colo. 204,212, 69 P. 568,571 (1902) (noting that without the prior public use rule 
"there would be no reasonable limit to the conditions under which the power of 
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Whatever the rationale, in the early 1900s, this court, along with many 
others, recognized that implicit in the "more necessary public use" requirement 
is an exception that applies when multiple public uses can coexist, and, therefore, 
it is unnecessary to prioritize them and decide which is more necessary. Indeed, 
courts have consistently recognized that where a proposed public use will not 
destroy the current public use, the statute allows both parties to utilize the 
property for public benefit. See, e.g., Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
ConsoL Mines Co., 174 P. 172,177 (Utah 1918); Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. 
Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 65 P. 735, 739 (Utah 1901). The practice of allowing the 
public to benefit from both uses whenever possible became known as the 
"compatible use" doctrine. 
Apart from being the necessary implication of the "more necessary public 
use" requirement, the compatible use doctrine stems from the policies 
underlying the eminent domain statutes: to encourage the use of land to its 
fullest extent to yield the greatest public benefit. N.M. Long & Co v. Cannon-
Papanikolas Constr. Co., 343 P.2d 1100,1102-03 (Utah 1959) (noting it is "salutary 
public policy" to encourage "the development of property for useful purpose."). 
To maximize public benefits, if "two public uses can stand together without 
material impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so stand." 
eminent domain might be exercised."); Greater Clark Cnty. Sch. Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Co., 179 Ind. App. 331, 333-34,385 N.E.2d 952, 954 (1979) ("[A]bsent the 
prior public use rule, the land could be condemned back and forth 
indefinitely."). 
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Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177; Salt Lake City Water, 67 P. at 677; Postal 
Tel Cable Co., 65 P. at 739. 
The compatible use doctrine also finds support in the eminent domain 
statute's authorization of the taking of land for an array of public purposes. Utah 
Code § 78B-6-501. As one court recognized more than a century ago, the fact that 
numerous public uses may further the public interest implies that where two 
authorized public uses can stand together, they must stand together. City of 
Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 30 N.E. 611, 611 (Mass. 1892) (noting it is 
"extremely improbable that the legislature could have intended, by the special 
act authorizing the city of Boston to take the land to lay water-pipes, to suspend 
the right of the town of Brookline to lay out a way over it"). 
Recognizing such rationales, the Utah Supreme Court first adopted and 
applied the compatible use doctrine in 1901. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. 735. 
Postal Telegraph involved a dispute between a telegraph company and a 
railroad. Id. at 736. The telegraph company offered to purchase part of a 
railroad's land for the purpose of expanding its telegraph line. Id. After 
negotiations failed, the telegraph company filed a condemnation action to obtain 
a right of way along the railroad track "for the purpose of constructing, 
maintaining, and operating its telegraph line" from Salt Lake City to Idaho. Id. 
The railroad company filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the telegraph 
company had no right to condemn a portion of the railroad's right of way 
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because the land was already appropriated to a public use, and the telegraph 
company had not established that its use for a telegraph was more necessary 
than its existing use by the railroad. Id. at 739. 
The district court held a hearing, and the telegraph company offered 
testimony to establish its use was consistent with the railroad's existing use and 
would not significantly interfere with railroad's operations. In response, E.E. 
Calvin, the General Superintendent of the railroad, testified that allowing the 
telegraph to put its line next to the railroad tracks would be a significant 
"interference" with the railroad's operation and future use and would create "an 
added danger" to the railroad. (See Brief Abstract of Oregon Short Line Railroad 
Company at 101, Postal Telegraph Cable Company v. Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Company, 65 P. 735 (1901) (No. 1252), filed September 28,1900, 
hereinafter "Brief of Appellants," attached as Addendum F). Specifically, 
Mr. Calvin testified that allowing the telegraph line next to the railroad would 
cause the following problems: 
• It would be an added cost to the railroad and would require 
the railroad to hire more workers to deal with the added 
maintenance; 
• The sagging wires from the telegraph line would create an 
added danger because they could be blown in the way of the 
train or break and fall on the track; 
• The added danger caused by the telegraph line would expose 
the railroad to liability and the railroad's passengers to 
personal injury; 
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• The telegraph poles and wires would directly affect the 
speedy and efficient operation of the railroad's business; 
• The telegraph would directly frustrate the railroad's concrete 
plans, provided for in its appropriation, to widen the 
embankment of its roadbed because the railroad needed the 
same land for this project that the telegraph sought to 
condemn.8 
Id at 103-107. 
After hearing from both parties, the district court denied the railroad's 
motion to dismiss, and the railroad appealed. This court affirmed. Postal Tel. 
Cable Co., 65 P. at 739. This court first recognized that under the condemnation 
statute when "lands have been once taken, by virtue of the power of eminent 
domain or otherwise, and appropriated to a public use . . . such land cannot 
again be subjected to another public use, unless such secondary appropriation be 
authorized by the legislature." Id. at 739. But after announcing that general rule, 
the court went on to say: 
The authorities however affirm that this rule only 
applies when the second public use, by reason of its 
nature or character, necessarily supersedes or destroys 
the former use. Where, as in this case, the construction 
of the telegraph line will not materially interfere with 
the use of appellant's land for railroad purposes, it is 
clear that the rule does not apply. 
8
 E.E. Calvin's testimony makes clear that these plans were not just ideas, but that 
they were reasonably certain future intentions. Specifically, he stated that "[i]t 
will not all be done this year, but it is all provided for in our appropriation for 
the immediate future for a large portion of the district, that would be covered by 
this line." (Brief of Appellants at 103). 
1 H 
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Id. (emphasis added). The court then held that despite the inconvenience to the 
railroad, and even in light of the modifications the railroad would need to make 
to its planned roadbed and additional effort to maintain its current operations 
efficiently, as long as the telegraph company compensated the railroad for those 
expenses, the uses were compatible under the compatible use doctrine. Id. 
This court again addressed the compatible use doctrine nearly two decades 
later. Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172 
(Utah 1918). In Monetaire Mining, the plaintiff mining company sought to 
condemn the right to use a portion of a mining tunnel used by the defendant 
mining company. Id. at 173. The plaintiff owned a valuable mining claim at the 
end of the tunnel, but had no ability to take advantage of it because the 
defendant owned most of the mining tunnel and had exclusive access to it. Id. 
The defendant mining company opposed the condemnation action, challenging 
the right of the plaintiff mining company to condemn a part of its tunnel for any 
purpose because the defendant was already using it. IcL at 174. 
The district court ruled that the plaintiff mining company had no right to 
condemn a portion of the tunnel. The plaintiff mining company appealed. On 
appeal, this court held that "[t]he evidence is without dispute that the tunnel is 
not being used or operated to its full capacity/' and, therefore, it would be 
"feasible" and "practicable" for both parties to use the tunnel: 
Under the statute of eminent domain the law seems to 
be well settled that, where two public uses can stand 
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together without material impairment or impediment of 
one by the other, they must so stand. 
Id. at 174,177 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
In support of that reasoning, this court quoted with approval Boston Water 
Power Company v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corporation, 23 Pick. 360 (Mass. 
1839), a seminal case in the development of the compatible use doctrine. Under 
the rule announced in Boston Water, two uses must "stand together" even if 
there is "some interference of the latter with the earlier," because such 
inconvenience may "be compensated for by damages." Monetaire Mining Co., 
174 P. at 177 (quoting Boston Water, 23 Pick. 360). In other words, the 
compatible use doctrine applies even if the existing use must be altered for the 
two uses to be compatible in practice, as long as the condemning party 
compensates for expenses associated with the interference or alterations. 
Taken together, Postal Telegraph and Monetaire Mining provide the 
foundation for Utah's compatible use doctrine and clarify that in considering 
whether two uses are compatible, Utah courts should adhere to the following 
principles: (i) public uses need not be the same kind to be compatible, and 
(ii) some interference and inconvenience to the current use by the proposed use 
does not defeat a condemnation action so long as alterations are feasible and the 
current owner is justly compensated for any related expenses. 
Under those principles, the district court in this case erred in ruling that 
the compatible use doctrine does not apply. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. The District Court Incorrectly Defined the Scope of Utah's Compatible 
Use Doctrine 
In defining the scope of Utah's compatible use doctrine, the district court 
made two errors of law. First, the district court ruled that Schroeder's use of a 
public road is incompatible with UDOT's use of a detention pond because the 
uses are not of the same kind. Second, the court ruled that UDOT was not 
required to accommodate both uses, even though Schroeder agreed to donate 
land and compensate UDOT for associated expenses. 
A* A Proposed Use and an Existing Use Need Not Be of the Same 
Kind to Be Compatible 
The district court first erred in ruling that two public uses must be of the 
same kind to be compatible under the compatible use doctrine. At the hearing 
on UDOTs motion for summary judgment the court ruled: 
It's clear to me t h a t . . . the compatibility part is —under 
Monetaire [Mining] doesn't work out. There is no 
compatibility if we can't keep it within that same use. 
In reading through Monetaire that's what I think [the 
court is] deciding, and that's going to be my finding and 
ruling today. 
(R.T. 687:41 (emphasis added).) That ruling directly conflicts with Utah law. 
Although the public uses happened to be the same in Monetaire Mining, this 
court has recognized that uses do not have to be of the same kind to be 
compatible under the compatible use doctrine. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739 
(authorizing telegraph to condemn railroad's land for the construction of a 
telegraph line). 
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Under Utah law, when one party is using property for a public purpose 
and a second party seeks to condemn a portion of that land for another distinct 
public purpose, the second party need not seek to use the property for the same 
purpose for the uses to be "compatible." Id at 738-39 (telegraph company could 
condemn right of way from railroad company to construct and maintain its 
telegraph lines); see also Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 
119 F.2d 16,20 (10th Or. 1941) ("It is well settled" under Utah law "that property 
devoted to one public use may, under general statutory authority, be taken for 
another public use, where the taking will not materially impair or interfere with, 
or is not inconsistent with the use already existing."). 
The same is true in numerous other jurisdictions that authorize takings for 
a second (and different) public use, so long as that use can be compatible with 
the first.9 The district court erred in ruling that the compatible use doctrine 
applies only where the uses are of the same kind. 
9
 See, e.g., Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston and Worcester R.R. Corp., 23 Pick. 
360 (Mass. 1839) (railroad could condemn portion of water company's receiving 
basin, to construct railway); City of Boston v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 30 N.E. at 
611 (permitting a town to lay out a street over land in which a city had laid its 
water pipes); Harrison Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. State Highway Comm'n, 284 So. 2d 50 
(Miss. 1973) (allowing a state highway commission to condemn for construction 
of an interstate highway part of a school board's land that was being used for 
recreational purposes); Mont. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 900 P.2d 888 
(Mont. 1995) (power company's desired easement across railroad's property to 
construct power lines was not inconsistent with the operation of the railroad); 
Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. Co. v. State Rd. Dep't, 176 So. 2d 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1965) (permitting a state road department to widen a road by condemning 
portions of a railroad company's right of way used for drainage); Long Island 
R.R. Co. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 103 A.D.2d 156,165-66 (N.Y. App. Div. 
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B. Interference and Inconvenience to the Current User Will Not 
Defeat a Condemnation Action, Especially Where the Condemnor 
Will Compensate for Alterations to the Current Use 
The district court also erred in ruling that "[w]hile it may be feasible/' to 
accommodate both projects, "Schroeder's proposal is not compatible with the 
intended and designed UDOT use" because the uses could be compatible only by 
requiring UDOT to make "modifications," including the acquisition of additional 
property Schroeder would give to UDOT. (R. 631-32.) 
There are three problems with the district court's ruling. First, the 
compatible use doctrine does not require that the current use remain 
unburdened. Second, the compatible use doctrine applies even if 
accommodating the second public use results in expenses, as long as the 
condemnor will pay just compensation to make the uses compatible. Third, were 
the rule otherwise, current users would have an incentive to formulate their uses 
to conflict with any proposed uses just to defeat condemnation actions and 
thereby deprive the public of the benefit of the additional public uses. 
1. A Proposed Use Is Compatible With an Existing Use Even 
Where the Proposed Use Will Interfere with the Existing Use 
The district court first erred in ruling that two uses are not compatible 
where the proposed use will burden the current use. But under the compatible 
1984) (allowing a gas and electric corporation to take an easement for placement 
of poles carrying overhead lines and conduits carrying underground lines in 
property owned by a railroad company); Vill. of Amityville v. Suffolk Cnty., 132 
N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) (holding county could condemn a right of way 
for a highway through a village's parking field). 
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use doctrine, a second use is incompatible with an existing use only if "by reason 
of its nature or character/' the proposed public use "necessarily supersedes or 
destroys the former use." Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739 (emphasis added).10 
In fact, even "[w]here there would otherwise be a material interference," courts 
have allowed a condemnation action to go forward "upon the condemnor's 
agreement to take affirmative action to avoid the interference."11 
Interference, inconvenience, or even permanent damage is insufficient to 
defeat a condemnation action. Hous. Auth. of City of Fort Lauderdale v. State 
Dep'tofTransp., 385 So. 2d 690, 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (noting it "is not 
material that some inconvenience may result to the prior user, if the conditions 
are such that the two uses can stand together."); Lake Cnty. Parks & Recreation 
10
 Gold v. Pittsburg, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 53 N.E. 285,289 (Ind. 1899) (noting that 
a proposed use is incompatible with an existing use if it "would necessarily 
supersede, or be destructive of, the current use of the land"); City of Worthington 
v. City of Columbus, Nos. 01AP-1119-1120,2002 WL 977341,115 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2002) ("[W]hen a condemnor, to which the power of eminent domain is given by 
law, seeks to exercise its power with respect to property already devoted to 
public use, its action may be enjoined if the proposed use will either destroy the 
existing use or interfere with it to such an extent as is tantamount to destruction." 
(emphasis added)). 
11
 Patricia Winmill, Acquisition of Rights-of-Way by Condemnation, Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Special Institute, 102A RMMLF-INST at § 9-20 (1998). It 
is important to note that Schroeder does not argue that the compatible use 
doctrine would require that a condemnation would be allowed in every case. 
Indeed, uses that would destroy or make impossible existing uses fall outside the 
scope of the compatible use doctrine. Whether a condemnation is allowed when 
the condemnor's use would interfere with the plans of the current property 
owner depends on the nature and extent of the interference, as well as how 
feasible it is for the second user to preserve the existing use. See infra, Part IB, 
§3 . 
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Bd. v. Indiana-American Water Co., 812 N.E.2d 1118,1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) 
(" Although we agree that the installation of the water main will temporarily 
disrupt the Board's use of the property, Indiana-American's use of the easement 
will not permanently affect the Board's use of the property as a recreational 
hiking and bike path."); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Nashville C & St. Ry. Co., 182 
S.W. 254 (Term. 1916) ("the theory underlying our statute is that when the 
interference does not [obstruct], the inconvenience and impairment may be 
compensated for in damages and the taking for the second use is permitted."). 
Instead, the two uses must be inherently incompatible and incapable of 
standing together. While Schroeder's road may require UDOT to make some 
alterations, UDOT has admitted that "[t]here is no question" that it is "feasible" 
for the land to be used for both projects, with little cost to UDOT. In the district 
court, a representative for UDOT conceded that: 
It is feasible. There is no question about tha t . . . . 
[Schroeder] is correct. . . . Provo River Contractors in 
anxious to [go] forward and they've said we'll work with 
Schroeder. Schroeder is willing to augment the use by 
adding some additional property, and so that won't cost, 
it won't delay, we can accomplish this. Yes, we can 
accomplish it, but is it harmonious with the present use? 
It is not. It is only rendered harmonious by the addition 
of this extra property. 
(R.T. 687:30.) In light of that concession, the two uses here are compatible under 
Utah's compatible use doctrine. 
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2. A Proposed Use Is Compatible With an Existing Use Where 
the Condemnor Agrees to Provide Just Compensation for 
Expenses Related to Interference with the Existing Use 
The district court also erred in ruling that the two uses are incompatible in 
light of Schroeder's agreement to donate the needed land to accommodate both 
projects and to compensate UDOT for related expenses. Under the compatible 
use doctrine, if the condemnor compensates an existing user for expenses related 
to burdens caused by the new use, then the uses are compatible. 
That rule is best illustrated in Freeman Gulch Mining Company v. 
Kennecott Copper Company, 119 F.2d 16,17 (10th Cir. 1941), in which a mining 
company sought to condemn the land of another mining company for use as a 
dump. The other mining company was already using the land for mining 
purposes, and the dump indisputably would have interfered with that use. Id. at 
19-20. To help minimize interference, the second mining company offered to 
construct new shafts, open trails, and drive a new tunnel for the first mining 
company to use. LI In applying Utah law, the court held that because the 
second mining company could make reasonable adjustments to preserve the 
existing use, the proposed use would not materially interfere with the existing 
operations, and, thus, condemnation was appropriate. L± at 20 ("for such 
inconvenience as Freeman may suffer, it may be adequately compensated for in 
damages/7). 
o/i 
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Freeman Gulch is consistent with cases decided by Utah courts,12 and with 
cases in other jurisdictions, that similarly hold that a condemnation may proceed 
even though the condemnor's use is inconsistent with the owner's use so long as 
the condemnor makes reasonable accommodations to remedy any interference.13 
Perhaps the most famous case applying that rule is a seminal case from 
Massachusetts relied upon by this court in developing Utah's compatible use 
doctrine. Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177 (quoting Boston Water Power 
Company v. Boston & W.R. Corp., 23 Pick. 360-98 (Mass. 1839)). Boston Water 
involved a dispute between a water power company and a railroad company. 23 
Pick, at 360. The water power company had built a dam and erected mills for the 
12
 Tacobsen v. Memmott, 354 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1960) (allowing mining 
company's condemnation action to go forward so long as mining company 
would agree to move location of its right of way if it conflicted with current 
owner's use); Monetaire Mining Co., 174 P. at 177 (allowing condemnation for 
common use of tunnel, because condemnor's agreement to construct turnouts 
and sidetracks would reduce interference to minimal level); Postal Tel. Cable Co., 
65 P. at 739 (allowing telegraph company to construct telegraph line so long as it 
took precautions to minimize interference with railroad operations); Highland 
Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 78 P. 296,296-97 (Utah 1904) (affirming 
issuance of condemnation decree on condition that condemnor agreed to move 
aerial tramway towers when necessary to allow condemnee to use his mining 
property). 
13
 See, e.g., Steele v. Empson, 41 N.E. 822, 825 (Ind. 1895) (noting that although 
plan for construction of drain was "partly located" on the right of way of current 
property owner, steps could be taken so drain would not "destroy" the use of the 
right of way); Montana Talc Co. v. Cyprus Mines Corp., 748 P.2d 444,452 (Mont. 
1987) (remanding condemnation action for trial court to consider "the possibility 
of joint operation to safeguard the rights of each party"); Western Union Tel. Co. 
v. Nashville C & St. Ry. Co., 182 S.W. 254,258 (Term. 1916) (noting telegraph 
company could condemn land along railroad line so long as it agreed to shift the 
location of its line and reset its poles to conform to changes in the railway's 
tracks). 
OCT 
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purpose of generating water power to sell to the public. Id. The railroad 
company sought to condemn a portion of the water company's land and waters 
to construct railroad tracks across the water company's receiving basins. Id. 
The water company argued that allowing the railroad company to 
construct its railroad across the basin would "greatly diminish the water power," 
causing "irreparable injury" and "nuisance." IcL at 363. The railroad company 
conceded that "the piers, embankments and bridges" erected in the construction 
of the railroad tracks in and over the full receiving basins would permanently 
"diminish the volume of water which those basins would otherwise contain," 
therefore "impairing] and diminish[ing] the water power to be derived 
therefrom." Id. at 390. But the railroad company contended that despite the 
inconvenience and irreparable injury to the water company, the railroad still had 
the right to condemn. Id. 391-92. According to the railroad, because the two 
uses could stand together, they necessarily must stand together, and the remedy 
was not to dismiss the condemnation action, but to require the railroad to 
compensate the water company, which after all is the principle underlying 
condemnation in the first place. Id. The district court agreed, and the water 
company appealed. Id. at 390. 
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts affirmed. Although the court 
recognized that the water company would be irreparably harmed from the 
condemnation, it held that the railroad's project and the water company's 
0£ 
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franchise were public uses that "could both stand together," because the 
railroad's proposed use could not be "considered as annulling or destroying [the 
water company's] franchise." Id. at 392, 394 (emphasis added). Although the 
railroad's project would admittedly occasion some serious damage to the power 
company, the remedy for such damage was just compensation, not dismissal. Id. 
at 394. 
As in Boston Water, Schroeder's use of a public road is compatible with 
UDOT's use not only because it would not annul or destroy UDOT's use but also 
because Schroeder has agreed to compensate UDOT for related expenses. Again, 
this court need not look further than UDOT's concessions in the district court. 
When asked whether Schroeder's proposal to give UDOT land to relocate its 
detention pond would allow the uses to stand together, UDOT stated: 
It is feasible. . . . Schroeder is willing to augment the 
use by adding some additional property, and so that 
won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this. 
(R.T. 687:30.) Thus, Schroeder's use and UDOT's use are compatible under the 
compatible use doctrine. They can coexist with little inconvenience to UDOT, 
and Schroeder will compensate UDOT for related expenses. 
3. The District Court's Interpretation of the Compatible Use 
Doctrine Reflects Bad Public Policy 
Not only is the district court's narrow interpretation of the compatible use 
doctrine incompatible with Utah law, its interpretation also reflects bad public 
policy by providing incentives to manipulate plans and uses to deprive the 
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public of additional public uses. If the compatible use doctrine is inapplicable 
any time a second use is different or inconvenient to the first, then where, as 
here, the property is sold after a condemnation action is filed and the new 
owner's use conflicts with the proposed use of the condemnor, the new owner 
would have a perverse incentive to design its use to conflict with the proposed 
use just to defeat the condemnation action. 
For that reason, courts suggest that the easier it is to change the existing 
use —in this case a detention pond to hold water—the more likely the use must 
be altered to accommodate the condemnor's proposed use. For example, the 
railroad company in Postal Telegraph that planned to widen the embankment of 
its roadbed along the railroad was required to alter its planned use. Id. at 738-39 
("The land which respondent seeks to condemn is not now used for any purpose. 
Practically it is now idle property, and the new use promises to be one of public 
utility."). Where both public uses can be accommodated, the public interest is 
best served by allowing both public uses of the property. 
Here, UDOT has conceded that it is "feasible" to make the uses compatible 
and that it will result in little cost or delay. Schroeder has agreed to compensate 
UDOT for related expenses, including donating adjacent land so that UDOT's 
detention pond can exist along with Schroeder's public road. This court should 
interpret Utah's compatible use doctrine to apply in such circumstances so that 
property owners cannot deny the public of the benefit of multiple public uses. 
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Conclusion 
Under the compatible use doctrine, two proposed public uses of property 
are compatible if the second use does not destroy the first use and costs related to 
making the uses compatible are compensated. In the district court, UDOT 
conceded that it was "feasible" to make its use compatible with Schroeder's use: 
"that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this." In light of that 
concession, the district court erred in ruling that the two uses are incompatible. 
And because the uses are compatible, Schroeder need not show that its proposed 
use is a more necessary public use than UDOTs proposed use. 
This court should vacate the summary judgment in favor of UDOT and 
remand to permit the court to apply the correct legal standard in determining 
whether the uses are compatible under Utah's compatible use doctrine. 
DATED this 16* day of April, 2012. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER L.L.C. 
Troy L. Bother 
Attorneys for Schroeder Investments, L.C. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS, L.C., a Utah 
limited liability company, 
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CLYDE C. EDWARDS, an individual; LINDA 
K. EDWARDS, an individual; UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, an 
agency of the State of Utah, and DOES 1 
THROUGH 10; 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF A 
MORE NECESSARY PUBLIC USE 
Civil No. 090404414 
Judge Darold J. McDade 
-
This matter comes before the Court on the Utah Department of Transportation's 
("UDOT") Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. UDOT brought this motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Schroeder Investments, 
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IX. 's ("Schroeder*') action against UDOT on the basis that UDOTs existing public use of the 
property sought to be condemned by Schroeder is a more necessary public use than the public use 
for which Schroeder bases its right to condemn. 
The Court, based on the memoranda of the parties, the supporting affidavits and 
documents, evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, testimony, and oral arguments 
presented by the parties makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Schroeder owns property located adjacent and to the south of the land sought to 
be condemned in this action. Schroeder's property is vacant, but zoned for development. 
Schroeder has asserted that it would like to place a self-storage development on this land. 
2. Schroeder's property is accessed by an existing 16.5 foot-wide easement across 
the property owned by Defendants Clyde C. Edwards, Linda K. Edwards (the "Edwards"), and 
UDOT (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"). 
3. Schroeder brought this action to widen the access easement from a width of 16.5 
feet to a width of 25 feet. Schroeder has stated that it anticipated Provo City would approve 
development of self-storage units on Schroeder's property, although evidence of such approval 
from Provo City was not presented to the Court. 
Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Basis for a More Necessary Public Use 
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4. UDOT acquired its interest in the Subject Property from the Edwards for use as a 
detention basin to retain and control highway water runoff and water bourne pollutants as part of 
the 1-15 CORE highway construction project. UDOT's public use included a specific water 
storage capacity needed for the project. 
5. In April 2009, UDOT began acquisition negotiations with the Edwards for 
acquisition of the Subject Property for the detention pond. On October 14,2009 a contract was. 
signed by the Edwards to sell the property to UDOT. UDOT accepted the contract and the 
contract closed in early December 2009 with the Edwards to UDOT deed recorded on December 
10,2009. 
6. Schroeder filed a Complaint to condemn against the Edwards on November 30, 
2009 and filed an Amended Complaint naming UDOT as a Defendant on September 24,2010. 
7. UDOT has presented persuasive evidence and the Court finds that the 1-15 CORE 
project is of important public necessity on local, state, national and international levels. 
8. UDOT has presented persuasive evidence and the Court finds that the detention 
pond is important to both water quality and to control highway water runoff and flood potential. 
9. The Court finds factually that the public use by UDOT is of greater public 
necessity as contemplated by UDOT, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(l)(d) than Plaintiff 
Schroeder's intended use as a by-way to a proposed self storage development. 
Order Granting UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
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10. The Court finds factually that Schroeder's proposed use is not compatible with 
UDOT's detention pond without additional modifications being made to the pond and in 
particular additional property being acquired to redesign and expand the pond in order to 
maintain the UDOT specified design capacity. 
11. According to the testimony of Ross Gravette, proffered by Schroeder, Schroeder's 
proposed public use of the Subject Property as a by-way cannot occur without significant 
modifications being made to UDOT's detention basin. Schroeder's proposed public use would 
require the detention basin to be redesigned to meet the specified water runoff capacity 
requirements for the 1-15 CORE project UDOT would be required to acquire additional 
property to accommodate the redesigned detention basin. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The chronology of Schroeder's filing of the original Complaint on November 30, 
2009 does not elevate its proposed use of the Edwards property over UDOT's use with the 
. UDOT deed being recorded December 10,2009. Under Utah law, title does not pass to a 
condemnor upon the commencement of a condemnation action. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-
516. UDOT acquired the property from the Edwards for the detention pond and that intended use 
commenced with the transfer of title. 
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2. As a condition precedent to a taking, it must appear that if the property is already 
appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary 
public use. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-504(l)(d). The Court finds as a conclusion of law that 
Schroeder fails this condition precedent. 
3. The Court finds that Utah has accepted the compatible use doctrine as announced 
in the case Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol Mines Co, et al, 174 P. 172 (Utah 
1918). In Monetaire, both condemnor and condemnee desired similar use of a mining tunnel. 
The Court allowed condemnation of extra capacity of the tunnel to be condemned, thus placing 
the tunnel in joint use. The Court stated this was to be allowed so long as the use in common is 
practicable and the prior use is not dispossessed or deprived. In the proposed Schroeder use, 
there is no unused capacity to be condemned. In order to continue UDOT's use the detention 
pond must be relocated on other property UDOT does not presently own. While it may be 
feasible, Schroeder's proposal is not compatible with the intended and designed UDOT use. 
As such, the Schroeder condemnation does not fall within the compatible use doctrine as 
adopted by the Utah court. This Court finds as a legal conclusion the proposed Schroeder public 
use is not compatible with the greater necessary UDOT public use because UDOT's use is of full 
capacity of the land and there is nothing left to condemn. 
Order Granting UDOT*s Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
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ORDER 
The Court grants UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff Schroeder 
Investments on the Amended Complaint This order adjudicates all claims as between Schroeder 
and UDOT and the adjudication of the remaining claims in this case will not impact or change 
the ruling made and confirmed in this order. Accordingly, the court, having determined that there 
is no just reason for delay, hereby certifies this decision as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1. 
Ordered this I'j day of ^l^pmj)^ , 2011. 
BY THE COURT 
m^i 
DARQLDJ.MCDADE 
"Fettnh Judicial District Court 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
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Sec. 22. [Private property for public use], UT CONST Art. 1, § 22 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Constitution of Utah 
Article I. Declaration of Rights 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. l, § 22 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use] 
Currentness 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation. 
Notes of Decisions (202) 
Current through 2011 Third Special Session. 
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§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain-Uses for which right may be exercised, UT ST § 78B-6-501 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos) 
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-6-501 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-34-1 
§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain—Uses for which right may be exercised 
Currentness 
Subject to the provisions of this part, the right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses: 
(1) all public uses authorized by the federal government; 
(2) public buildings and grounds for the use of the state, and all other public uses authorized by the Legislature; 
(3)(a) public buildings and grounds for the use of any county, city, town, or board of education; 
(b) reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any county, 
city, or town, or for the draining of any county, city, or town; 
(c) the raising of the banks of streams, removing obstructions from streams, and widening, deepening, or straightening their 
channels; 
(d) bicycle paths and sidewalks adjacent to paved roads; 
(e) roads, streets, and alleys for public vehicular use, excluding trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, 
equestrian use, or other recreational uses, or whose primary purpose is as a foot path, equestrian trail, bicycle path, or 
walkway; and 
(f) all other public uses for the benefit of any county, city, or town, or its inhabitants; 
(4) wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads, roads for transportation 
by traction engines or road locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and railroads and street railways for public 
transportation; 
(5) reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of persons, mines, mills, 
smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or for irrigation purposes, or for the 
draining and reclaiming of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds 
and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; 
(6)(a) roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places to access or facilitate the milling, smelting, 
or other reduction of ores, or the working of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
(b) outlets, natural or otherwise, for the deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, smelters or other works for 
the reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including minerals in solution; 
(c) mill dams; 
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§ 78B-6-501. Eminent domain-Uses for which right may be exercised, UT ST § 78B-6-501 
(d) gas, oil or coal pipelines, tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or formation in any land for the underground 
storage of natural gas, and in connection with that, any other interests in property which may be required to adequately 
examine, prepare, maintain, and operate underground natural gas storage facilities; 
(e) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution; and 
(f) any occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, mineral deposits, mills, 
smelters, or other places for the reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter; 
(7) byroads leading from a highway to : 
(a) a residence; 
(b) a development; or 
(c) a farm; 
(8) telegraph, telephone, electric light and electric power lines, and sites for electric light and power plants; 
(9) sewage service for: 
(a) a city,a town, or any settlement of not less than 10 families; 
(b) a development; 
(c) a public building belonging to the state; or 
(d) a college or university; 
(10) canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation of 
machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for power, light or heat; 
(11) cemeteries and public parks, except for a park whose primary use is: 
(a) as a trail, path, or other way for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; or 
(b) to connect other trails, paths, or other ways for walking, hiking, bicycling, or equestrian use; 
(12) pipe lines for the purpose of conducting any and all liquids connected with the manufacture of beet sugar; and 
(13) sites for mills, smelters or other works for the reduction of ores and necessary to their successful operation, including the 
right to take lands for the discharge and natural distribution of smoke, fumes, and dust, produced by the operation of works, 
provided that the powers granted by this section may not be exercised in any county where the population exceeds 20,000, 
or within one mile of the limits of any city or incorporated town nor unless the proposed condemner has the right to operate 
by purchase, option to purchase or easement, at least 75% in value of land acreage owned by persons or corporations situated 
within a radius of four miles from the mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores; nor beyond the limits of the four-
mile radius; nor as to lands covered by contracts, easements, or agreements existing between the condemner and the owner of 
land within the limit and providing for the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores; nor until an 
action shall have been commenced to restrain the operation of such mill, smelter, or other works for the reduction of ores. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 942, eff. Feb. 7,2008; Laws 2008, c. 341, § 1, eff. May 5,2008; Laws 2010, c. 401, § 1, eff. May 11,2010; 
Laws 2011, c. 82, § 1, eff. May 10, 2011. 
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West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Armos) 
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos) 
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-6-502 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-34-2 
§ 78B-6-502. Estates and rights that may be taken 
Currentness 
The following estates and rights in lands are subject to being taken for public use: 
(1) a fee simple, when taken for: 
(a) public buildings or grounds; 
(b) permanent buildings; 
(c) reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned by them; 
(d) any permanent flood control structure affixed to the land; 
(e) an outlet for a flow, a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction 
of ores; and 
(f) solar evaporation ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution, except when the surface ground is 
underlaid with minerals, coal, or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be 
taken over the surface ground over the deposits; 
(2) an easement, when taken for any other use; and 
(3) the right of entry upon and occupation of lands, with the right to take from those lands earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber 
as necessary for a public use. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 943, eff. Feb. 7, 2008. 
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§ 78B-6-503. Private property which may be taken, UT ST § 78B-6-503 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos) 
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs & Annos) 
U.CJL 1953 § 78B-6-503 
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-34-3 
§ 78B-6-503. Private property which may be taken 
Currentness 
Private property which may be taken under this part includes: 
(1) all real property belonging to any person; 
(2) lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated town, not appropriated to some public use; 
(3) property appropriated to public use; provided that the property may not be taken unless for a more necessary public use 
than that to which it has already been appropriated; 
(4) franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; provided that the franchises may not be taken unless 
for free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use; 
(5) all rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in Section 78B-6-501 hereof, and any and all structures and 
improvements on the property, and the lands held or used in connection with the property, shall be subject to be connected 
with, crossed, or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure; they shall also be subject to a limited use 
in common with the owners, when necessary; but uses of crossings, intersections, and connections shall be made in the manner 
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private injury; and 
(6) all classes of private property not enumerated if the taking is authorized by law. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 944, eff Feb. 7, 2008. 
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§ 78B-6-504. Conditions precedent to taking, UT ST § 78B-6-504 
West's Utah Code Annotated 
Title 78B. Judicial Code 
Chapter 6. Particular Proceedings (Refs & Annos) 
Part 5. Eminent Domain (Refs &Annos) 
U.CA. 1953 § 78B-6-504 
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-34-4 
§ 78B-6-504. Conditions precedent to taking 
Currentness 
(1) Before property can be taken it must appear that: 
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
(b) the taking is necessary for the use; 
(c) construction and use of ail property sought to be condemned will commence within a reasonable time as determined by 
the court, after the initiation of proceedings under this part; and 
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the public use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
(2)(a) As used in this section, "governing body" means: 
(i) for a county, city, or town, the legislative body of the county, city, or town; and 
(ii) for any other political subdivision of the state, the person or body with authority to govern the affairs of the political 
subdivision. 
(b) Property may not be taken by a political subdivision of the state unless the governing body of the political subdivision 
approves the taking. 
(c) Before taking a final vote to approve the filing of an eminent domain action, the governing body of each political 
subdivision intending to take property shall provide written notice to each owner of property to be taken of each public 
meeting of the political subdivision's governing body at which a vote on the proposed taking is expected to occur and allow 
the property owner the opportunity to be heard on the proposed taking. 
(d) The requirement under Subsection (2)(c) to provide notice to a property owner is satisfied by the governing body mailing 
the written notice to the property owner: 
(i) at the owner's address as shown on the records of the county assessor's office; and 
(ii) at least 10 business days before the public meeting. 
Credits 
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 945, eff. Feb. 7,2008. 
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174 P. 172 
53 Utah 413 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
MONETAIRE MINING CO. 
v. 
COLUMBUS REXALL CONSOL. MINES CO. et al. 
No. 3142. I March 11,1918. | On 
Application for Rehearing, May 31,1918. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake County; P. C. Evans, 
Judge. 
Action by the Monetaire Mining Company against the 
Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Company and others. 
Judgment for defendant named, and plaintiff appeals. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Corfman and McCarty, JJ., dissenting. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*173 N. V. Jones, of Salt Lake City (Wm. M. McCrea and P. 
L. Williams, both of Salt Lake City, of counsel), for appellant. 
Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette, of Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
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It is further alleged that said mining claim contains gold, 
silver, copper, and other precious metals, and that for that 
reason it is a valuable mining claim, and that the same has 
been developed only in part; that a certain mining tunnel, 
marked "T T" on the plat, was constructed, and of which 
respondent is a part owner as hereinafter stated; that said 
tunnel, from its portal, marked "P" on the plat, to the south 
side line of appellant's said mining claim, marked "H", is 
approximately 3,078 feet in length, of which respondent owns 
all except 1,888 feet, which is that portion lying immediately 
south of the point marked "e" on the plat; that the whole length 
of said tunnel, from its portal to the end thereof, which is 
Opinion 
FRICK, C. J. 
The plaintiff, hereinafter called appellant, commenced this 
action against the Columbus Extension Mining Company, 
the Rexall Silver & Copper Mining Company, the Columbus 
Rexall Consolidated Mines Company, and Alexander H. 
Cowie to condemn a right to use a certain mining tunnel 
in common with the defendant the Columbus Rexall 
Consolidated Mines Company, a corporation, hereinafter 
designated respondent. The defendants other than the 
respondent, for reasons appearing in the record, may be 
excluded from consideration on this appeal, and we shall not 
refer to them again. 
The complaint is very long, and we shall, in the briefest 
possible terms, refer to those portions which are deemed 
material. 
The appellant alleges that it is a mining corporation; that 
its business is to own, acquire, work, and develop mining 
property; that the respondent is a corporation engaged in a 
similar business; that the appellant is the owner of a certain 
mining claim known as the "Haskel," which is marked "H" 
on the following plat: 
some distance north of the northerly side line of appellant's 
said mining claim, is approximately 4,700 feet; that the 
distance involved in this action, however, is that portion 
only which lies between the south side line of appellant's 
said mining claim and the point marked "e" on the plat, 
being a distance of approximately 1,190 feet; that said tunnel 
passes through appellant's said mining claim about 1,200 feet 
below the surface of said claim; that the appellant has an 
agreement with the defendants, other than the respondent, 
whereby it is given the right to use said tunnel for said 
distance of 1,888 feet, together with the track and appliances 
therein, for the purpose of transporting the ores containing the 
precious metals aforesaid, and the waste material that may be 
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produced in working and developing appellant's said mining 
claim, to the outer surface of said tunnel; that the respondent 
constructed said tunnel through appellant's said mining claim 
without authority therefor and without its consent, and in 
doing so uncovered and exposed large quantities of ores, 
much of which are being wasted for reasons fully set forth in 
the complaint; that the appellant desires to condemn the right 
to a temporary use of the 1,190 feet aforesaid, and the track or 
tramway therein, such use to be a use in common or joint use 
with respondent, and to be for the purpose of transporting the 
ores containing the precious metals aforesaid to the surface, 
and also to transport the waste material that may be *174 
developed in further developing the ores of said mining claim 
to the surface, and to take into appellant's said mining claim 
the tools and appliances necessary to work, and to develop the 
mineral deposits therein; that the appellant seeks to condemn 
the use of said tunnel, tracks, etc., as aforesaid for a limited 
period of time only, to wit, for a time sufficient to permit 
the appellant to mine and remove the ores containing such 
precious metals from its said mining claim; that said tunnel 
is not being used to its full capacity, and appellant avers that 
it is practicable to make arrangements so as to permit the 
appellant to use said tunnel, tracks, etc., to transport its said 
ores, etc., through said tunnel, "without materially injuring or 
damaging" the respondent. The complaint contains numerous 
other allegations of similar import, but, in view of what 
follows, we deem it unnecessary to go further into detail. The 
appellant prayed for the relief outlined in the complaint. 
The respondent alone answered the complaint, and the 
hearing was limited to the appellant and respondent. 
The answer is very long, containing 25 paragraphs. While 
many of appellant's allegations are denied in the answer, yet 
the principal purpose is to challenge the right of appellant to 
condemn the tunnel, tracks, etc., for the purposes aforesaid, 
or for any purpose. 
The appellant produced evidence in support of the allegations 
of its complaint. The evidence is without dispute that the 
tunnel is not being used or operated to its full capacity, 
and that it is feasible and practicable to operate said tunnel 
so as to permit both the said respondent and the appellant 
to develop their respective mining claims and the mineral 
deposits therein, and to transport the ores developed and the 
waste material resulting from such development through said 
tunnel over a single track; that, if necessary, turnouts can be 
constructed at reasonable intervals and at reasonable expense 
in said tunnel, and side tracks can be laid in such turnouts so 
as to permit the transportation of the ores and waste material 
of both appellant and respondent without inconvenience or 
interruption; that the capacity of said tunnel is variously 
estimated at from 500 to 1,500 tons for two shifts each day, or 
even more, depending on the motive power by which the ores 
would be transported; and that said tunnel, at the time of the 
trial, was used to transport only a very small fraction of that 
amount. Indeed, the evidence is to the effect that the capacity 
of the tunnel is sufficient to develop and to transport the ores 
and waste material for at least three or four of the best mines 
in that vicinity. 
We remark that the foregoing plat is not intended as correctly 
indicating the numerous courses of said tunnel. All that is 
attempted is to give the correct distances in feet and the 
general direction of the tunnel. 
The theory of respondent's counsel, and upon which they 
tried the case, is best illustrated by what they said after 
the appellant had produced its evidence and rested its case. 
Counsel said that they did not desire to present any evidence 
"for the reason that the defendant [respondent here] is of the 
opinion and states with confidence that the law is that no 
right to condemn a right of way or easement through that 
tunnel has been or can be shown." Counsel therefore took the 
position, and they insist upon it in this court, that regardless 
of the evidence that could be produced by the appellant the 
law would, nevertheless, always stand in the way of its right 
to condemn an easement in the tunnel for the purposes desired 
by it. It seems the district court entertained the same view, 
which, to some extent at least, is reflected in what are called 
the findings, which are as follows: 
"The court heard the testimony introduced 
by the parties and arguments of counsel, and 
thereupon took the matter under advisement. 
And now, having fully considered the same, 
the court finds that the evidence in the 
cause is manifestly insufficient to support the 
allegations of the said complaint, and that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to recover against the 
defendant." 
Upon those so-called findings the court entered judgment 
dismissing the action, and appellant insists that the court erred 
in its findings, conclusions of law, and judgment. 
[1] [2] No one, we think, will seriously contend that the 
foregoing constitutes a finding of facts. It is a mere conclusion 
that the evidence is insufficient to authorize any relief without 
finding any fact or facts. The so-called findings, and the 
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court and of respondent's counsel, and, in legal effect, are the 
same as though the court had sustained a general demurrer to 
the complaint and had dismissed the action. We shall so treat 
the matter here. 
We remark that the mining claim in question is an old patented 
claim located under the law of 1866, and is but 200 feet 
in width. The question to be determined on this appeal, 
therefore, is one of law merely, which may be stated thus: 
Can appellant, under our statute authorizing the exercise of 
eminent domain, condemn an easement in or the right to use 
the tunnel in question for the purposes desired by it? 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3588, as amended by chapter 47, Laws 
Utah 1909, p. 50, is divided into 13 subdivisions, in which 
are enumerated the specific purposes for which the right of 
eminent domain may be exercised. It is not necessary to set 
forth all of the purposes enumerated in the statute. So far as 
material here, the section referred to provides: 
"Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the 
right of eminent domain may be exercised 
in behalf of the following public uses: 
*** (6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, 
ditches, flumes, pipes, and dumping places 
to facilitate *175 the milling, smelting, 
or other reduction of ores, or the working 
of mines, quarries, coal mines, or mineral 
deposits; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the 
deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse, or water 
from mills, smelters, or other works for the 
reduction of ores, or from mines, quarries, coal 
mines, or mineral deposits; milldams; natural 
gas or oil [pipe] lines, tanks, or reservoirs; also 
any occupancy in common by the owners or 
possessors of different mines, quarries, coal 
mines, mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or 
other places for the reduction of ores, or any 
place for the flow, deposit, or conduct of 
tailings or refuse matter." 
Appellant contends that the right to condemn an easement in 
or through said tunnel for the purposes contemplated in this 
action is granted in the foregoing subdivision. Upon the other 
hand, respondent contends that the right is not granted. 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3590, subd. 3, also provides: 
"Property appropriated to public use; 
provided, that such property shall not be 
taken unless for a more necessary public 
use than that to which it has been already 
appropriated." 
Subdivision 5 of the section last referred to reads: 
"All rights of way for any and all purposes 
mentioned in section 3588, and any and all 
structures and improvements thereon, and the 
lands held or used in connection therewith, 
shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, 
or intersected by any other right of way or 
improvement or structure thereon; they shall 
also be subject to a limited use in common 
with the owners thereof, when necessary; 
but such uses of crossings, intersections, and 
connections shall be made in the manner most 
compatible with the greatest public benefit and 
the least private injury." 
And subdivision 6 is as follows: 
"All classes of private property not 
enumerated may be taken for public use when 
such taking is authorized by law." 
At the hearing of the cause in this court some contention 
was made that that portion of section 3588, supra, which we 
have copied is not correctly printed in chapter 47, Laws Utah 
1909, by which chapter said section was amended. We have 
carefully compared the language of subdivision 6 of the act 
as printed in chapter 47 aforesaid with the original act on file 
in the office of the Secretary of State, and we find that the 
only change is that in printing chapter 47 the word "pipe" is 
omitted between the words "oil" and "lines." The original act 
as passed reads "oil pipe lines," while the printed act reads 
"oil lines." There is no other difference between the original 
act as passed and the printed act. The question therefore is, Is 
the right sought to be exercised by appellant granted in any 
one or more of the foregoing provisions? 
[3] If the right is granted, the court has but one duty to 
perform, and that is to enforce it and make it effective. Upon 
the other hand, if the right is not granted, either in terms or by 
necessary implication, then the courts are powerless to grant 
the relief appellant seeks. In examining all of the subdivisions 
of section 3588 and of section 3590, one becomes convinced 
that it was the intention of the legislative power of this state 
to declare mining generally and the development of mines 
and mineral deposits a public use, in furtherance of which 
the right of the exercise of eminent domain was applied 
with full force and effect. This is apparent from the first 
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enactment of the law of eminent domain as found in Laws 
Utah 1884, tit. 7, p. 348. Section 3588 has been amended 
and extended in some particulars ever since title 7 of 1884 
was enacted. The intention of the Legislature to extend the 
right of eminent domain to mines and mining being clear and 
unequivocal, what is the rule respecting the construction and 
application that should be given to the acts of the Legislature 
in granting the right of eminent domain for the uses and 
purposes contemplated in the act? 
[4] If appellant's application merely involved the exercise of 
the right of eminent domain to construct a tunnel through, or 
a road or passageway over, respondent's mining claims, or the 
right to the use, in common with respondent, of any part of 
the latter's ground for dumping purposes, etc., no one would 
either question or doubt appellant's right to condemn the right 
for such purposes. In view, however, that appellant seeks to 
obtain an easement merely in a tunnel owned by respondent, 
it is earnestly contended that no such right exists. By a careful 
reading and comparison of the several subdivisions aforesaid, 
it seems clear to us that the right of eminent domain may be 
exercised to condemn an easement in or through respondent's 
tunnel as contemplated by the appellant. A use in common 
is clearly contemplated for some purpose, and we think the 
purpose for which the appellant seeks to exercise the right 
in this case is included. That certainly is so if all of the 
provisions of our statute are given a fair and reasonable 
application and effect. In subdivision 6 of section 3588, which 
we have set forth, the power to condemn rights of way 
for tunnels is expressly granted; and in section 3590, subd. 
5: "All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned 
in section 3588 *** shall also be subject to a limited use 
in common with the owners thereof, when necessary," etc. 
Tunnels, when necessary, are therefore subject to a limited 
use in common, precisely as are all other "rights of way" or 
easements mentioned in the statute. In view of the foregoing, 
what is the rule of construction applicable here? 
[5] We think it is generally agreed that where the right of 
eminent domain is granted for a particular purpose, then the 
statute must be given a liberal construction in furtherance of 
such purpose. Our statute, in clear and explicit terms, grants 
the right of eminent domain for the purpose of developing 
the mining industry and for the purpose of developing the 
mineral resources of the state, regardless of ownership. Under 
those circumstances, *176 therefore, the rule of construction 
that is applied by Mr. Justice Hawley in the case of Douglass 
v. Byrnes (C. C.) 59 Fed. 28, should be applied. Mr. Justice 
Hawley, in passing upon the eminent domain act of the state 
of Nevada respecting the development of mines (C. C.) 59 
Fed. at page 31, says: 
"The power of the Legislature having 
been fully recognized and sanctioned, the 
purpose of the act should not be hampered 
by any narrow or technical objections. 
The importance of encouraging the mining 
industry of this state must be kept in view. 
This was the object, intent, and purpose of 
the Legislature in passing the act, and its 
wisdom, policy, and expediency was thereby 
determined. A reasonable, fair, just, broad, 
and liberal view should be taken by the court 
in interpreting its provisions." 
To the same effect is Butte A. & P. R. Co. v. Montana U. R. 
Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. A. 298, 50 Am. St. 
Rep. 508. 
Mr. Lindley, in discussing the right of eminent domain as 
applied to mining, in his excellent work on Mines, in volume 
1 (3d Ed.) p. 612, says: 
"It is manifest, however, that there is a marked 
tendency, evolutionary in its nature, to break 
away from the old rigid rules on the subject 
of 'public use,' and to enlarge the definition 
of the term, so as to make it synonymous 
with 'public welfare.' This tendency is no 
doubt influenced to some extent by the growth 
and spread of sociological ideas which seek 
to influence the construction of constitutions 
and statutes in the interest of the group 
instead of the individual, and to authorize 
the condemnation of private property for 
any use which stimulates or encourages the 
development of the natural resources of the 
country. As to what uses will accomplish 
this purpose, each state must determine for 
itself. As there exist marked differences in 
environment and economic conditions, it is 
hardly likely that uniform decisions in all the 
states will ever be reached. But the test of 
'public welfare,' instead of the old doctrine of 
'public use,' is being gradually extended, with 
the promise of its becoming the prevailing 
doctrine in most jurisdictions." 
[6] It is contended that under Comp. Laws 1907, § 3590, subd. 
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the eminent domain statute "for a more necessary public use" 
than the one for which it is appropriated. That no doubt is 
the law, and, so far as we know, is generally enforced in this 
country. It must also be conceded that the use appellant seeks 
to make of the tunnel in question is not a more necessary use 
than the one respondent is making of it. Appellant, therefore, 
cannot succeed under the clause of the statute last referred to. 
What appellant seeks is not to appropriate respondent's tunnel 
and to dispossess the latter of its property rights therein or 
of its use, but what appellant seeks is to condemn the right 
to use the tunnel in common with the respondent; that is, to 
condemn the unused capacity of the tunnel. Where property is 
condemned for a more necessary use, the original condemner 
is deprived of his ownership and use. Such is not the case, 
however, where a second right to use the property or right 
of way is one in common with the present owner thereof. 
This distinction must be clearly kept in mind, and, if it is, no 
confusion can arise. In condemning the right to a joint use 
or a use in common, all that the condemner gets, or can get, 
is the right to use that which the present possessor or owner 
does not or cannot use. For example. If in this case respondent 
uses the tunnel in question to its fall capacity, then there is 
nothing left to condemn, and, as a matter of course, appellant 
cannot prevail. Where, however, as clearly appears from the 
evidence in this case, a tunnel is not used by the owner and 
possessor thereof to its fall capacity, and it is reasonably clear 
that a joint use or a use in common is practicable, then why 
may not the unused portion of the tunnel be condemned upon 
proper compensation being made to the owner and possessor 
thereof? In doing that the owner's property is not taken from 
him. Indeed, he is not even dispossessed of it nor deprived of 
its use or control, but the only thing that is done is that the 
owner must )deld his exclusive dominion over it for what Mr. 
Lindley calls the "public welfare." 
[7] [8] Counsel, however, state that there is no way to 
determine what the compensation shall be to the owner. It is, 
however, well settled that, where property may be condemned 
for the purpose of a joint use or a use in common, the whole 
matter of determining what is a reasonable compensation 
under all the circumstances, as well as the regulations 
respecting the use of the property, is determined and regulated 
according to the rules of equity. 2 Lewis, Eminent Domain 
(3d Ed.) § 423. When it is once settled and understood that 
the unused portion of a mining tunnel may be condemned and 
may be used to develop the mineral deposits in an adjoining 
mine, the respective mine owners will generally find no 
difficulty in arriving at some understanding respecting the 
character and extent of the compensation that shall be made 
for the use of the tunnel. Moreover, as a general rule, the 
respective owners will agree upon the manner and extent 
of the use. If, however, the parties cannot agree, the courts 
have fall power to determine and fix the character and extent 
of the compensation, and to regulate the use of the tunnel 
between the parties. All this may be done after the court has 
heard the evidence and is in possession of all the facts and 
circumstances. 
In view that the business of mining is necessarily highly 
speculative; that the prices of most metals are fluctuating so 
that to mine a certain grade of ore may be profitable this year 
while the price may be so much lower the next that it would 
be ruinous to attempt to mine it; that the contemplated ore 
bodies may be much smaller in extent than was expected; 
and numerous other things that might be mentioned-the joint 
use of a mining tunnel of necessity must be temporary only. 
It is for that reason that *177 some equitable method of 
determining and fixing the compensation for the joint use 
must be devised which must be based upon all the known 
facts and circumstances, and must be such as to reflect 
justice in each case. To fix the compensation in a lump sum 
might defeat the very end in view. Some just method of 
compensation is all the law contemplates, and that is all that 
can be required in each case. It is manifest that in this case 
no effort whatever was made by appellant and respondent 
to arrive at an understanding regarding either the character 
or extent of compensation, nor with regard to the nature and 
extent of the use of the tunnel by appellant; and it is equally 
manifest that so long as the respondent can treat the tunnel 
in question as its own private affair, to which no one may 
gain access except by its consent, no such an understanding 
or agreement is possible. 
Respondent's counsel, however, insist that it has been decided 
by respectable courts that the use of the tunnel contemplated 
by the appellant cannot be condemned under statutes similar 
to our own. The case of Amador-Queen M. Co. v. Dewitt, 
73 Cal. 482, 15 Pac. 74, is cited and relied on. In that case 
the right to a joint use of the mining tunnel was denied upon 
the sole ground that the joint use which was sought was for 
a private and not for a public use. In view that the right of 
condemnation in cases of rights of way for tunnels must be 
based upon the claim that the use of mining tunnels is a public 
use, it is not easy to see how the California court arrived at the 
conclusion aforesaid. It would seem that if the right of way for 
a tunnel may be condemned because such right contemplates 
a public use, then it must also follow that the operation of the 
tunnel would likewise constitute a public use. How, then, can 
it be said that a joint use is a private use? It would seem that 
no farther comment is necessary. 
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It is, however, further contended that the decision in the case 
of Headrick v. Larson, 152 Fed. 93, 81 C. C. A. 317, is 
decisive of the question involved here. It is contended that in 
that case it is squarely held that the joint use of a mining tunnel 
may not be condemned under an eminent domain statute 
similar to ours. It may be that the court which rendered the 
decision in that case may ultimately arrive at the conclusion 
contended for by counsel, but it is manifest that it did not do so 
in that case, all of which is demonstrated by having recourse 
to the language used by the court in deciding that case. After 
discussing the questions involved in that case at some length, 
Mr. Justice Gilbert, United States Circuit Judge, closes the 
opinion thus: 
"But the present suit is not a suit to condemn 
a right of way over the tunnel. It is a suit in 
equity to compel the joint use of a right of 
way already condemned by another, and to 
obtain the right to participate in the benefits 
thereof, on the theory that the condemnation 
has been made for a public use, and that 
the applicants are members of the public for 
whom such condemnation has been adjudged. 
There is no allegation showing the necessity 
of such common use, and nothing to show that 
the appellants cannot proceed and condemn a 
right of way for a tunnel, as was done by the 
appellees." 
[9] [10] It may safely be asserted, therefore, that all that is or 
could be decided in that case is that the plaintiffs had selected 
the wrong remedy. Upon the other hand, it has often been held 
by the courts of the highest respectability that one easement 
may be superimposed, so to speak, upon another. This is the 
doctrine of this court. Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake Water, 
etc., Co., 24 Utah, 249. In that case, at page 264, 67 Pac. 
at page 677 (61 L. R. A. 648), it is said: "Under the statute 
of eminent domain the law seems to be well settled that, 
where two public uses can stand together without material 
impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so 
stand." That is the conclusion also of Mr. Chief Justice Shaw 
in the case of Boston, etc., Co. v. Boston, etc., Co., 23 Pick. 
(Mass.) 360-398, where, in referring to the two uses there in 
question, the Chief Justice said: "Both uses may well stand 
together, with some interference of the latter with the earlier, 
which may be compensated for by damages." In principle is 
there, can there be, any difference between superimposing 
one public easement or use upon another public easement 
or use, as was done in the case last above cited, and in the 
cases of Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah, 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 208, 101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300, 
Tanner v. Canal & Irr. Co., 40 Utah, 105, 121 Pac. 584, and 
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irr. Co., 40 Utah, 126, 121 
Pac. 592, and a case like the one at bar? The mere fact that 
in this case the tunnel in question is owned by respondent 
in no way affects the principle of law announced in the 
foregoing cases. In those, as in all other cases where it is 
sought to acquire property or rights by the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain, the burden of proof rests upon 
the condemner to show that the use is a public use, and 
that its exercise is necessary in the particular case. Both of 
those questions in this state must be determined by the court, 
and both must be determined in favor of the condemner, 
as preliminary questions before the property or the right to 
an easement therein can be condemned. In view that the 
appropriation of property and the acquiring of an easement 
therein for the purposes of developing the mineral resources 
of this state have always been considered as being public 
uses, we cannot see any escape from the conclusion that the 
right that appellant seeks to acquire is clearly for the public 
use. Neither the allegations of the complaint nor the evidence 
produced in support thereof leave any room for doubt on that 
question. 
[11] The only other question, therefore, is, did the appellant 
show any necessity for the exercise of the right? As to that 
we are of *178 the opinion that if the right to a joint use 
of the mining tunnel may be obtained at all by condemnation 
proceedings-and we are fully convinced that it may be-then 
the evidence is also, prima facie at least, sufficient to show 
that it is necessary for the appellant to have the joint use of 
the tunnel in question in order to develop and mine the ores 
in the Haskel mining claim. It seems that, if appellant cannot 
reach the mineral deposits in said claim through respondent's 
tunnel, the great cost of constructing a tunnel of its own will 
prevent it from ever successfully developing and removing 
said mineral deposits. What would be true in the case of 
appellant would be equally true with respect to any person 
to whom it might sell the mining claim, except possibly the 
respondent. It is too late now to insist that the people of both 
the state and nation are not interested in and benefited by 
the development of the mineral resources and wealth of both 
the state and the nation. The people are likewise interested in 
having the mineral resources developed at as little cost and 
expense as possible, since in no other way can the ores of the 
lower grades be developed and mined. As we view it, every 
element is present in this case which is required by our statute 
to authorize the exercise of the right of eminent domain. The 
district court therefore erred in making the so-called finding, 
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in making the conclusion of law, and in entering judgment 
dismissing the action. 
In conclusion we desire to state that there are many allegations 
in the complaint which to our minds seem unnecessary, while 
there are others that might well be more specific and certain. 
The same may be said of the answer. The defects in the 
pleadings are no doubt due to the fact that the law upon this 
question had never been settled by this court, and that both 
parties, if we may say so, were merely feeling their way. 
For the reasons stated the judgment is reversed and the cause 
is remanded to the district court, with directions to grant 
the appellant a new trial, and to proceed with the case in 
accordance with the views herein expressed. Appellant to 
recover costs on appeal. 
THURMAN and GIDEON, JJ., concur. 
CORFMAN, J. 
I dissent. It is conceded that appellant is not seeking to 
exercise the right of eminent domain on the ground that 
respondent's tunnel is to be used "for a more necessary public 
use" than the one for which it was originally constructed, 
and is now being continuously occupied and used in the 
operation and development of respondent's mines. In fact, 
the only contention made by appellant is that it seeks to 
acquire the right to a mere temporary use, a use in common 
with the respondent, for the express purpose of enabling 
appellant to make quick development of its mineral lands, 
mine, extract, and market its ores at a nominal expense, and 
with less inconvenience to itself than under the circumstances 
and existing conditions could otherwise be done in the 
construction of a tunnel by its own labor and at its own 
cost. That the contemplated use of the tunnel in question by 
appellant is precisely the same use for which the respondent, 
at great expense, constructed it, and is now continuously 
using it in the development and operation of its mines, is 
also a conceded fact. It is also apparent from the record 
here that appellant's mine, for which a right to a joint use of 
respondent's tunnel is sought, is only partially developed. The 
same is shown to be true of respondent's mine. The mines 
of the respective parties are in the prospective stages only. 
Whether the appellant would pass one mine car of material 
from its mine over respondent's track each day or a thousand 
is purely problematical. The future needs of respondent in that 
regard are equally so. Appellant's right to acquire an interest 
in the tunnel must be predicated upon either some express 
legislative enactment or some reasonable intendment of our 
statute, and then again some reasonable necessity for the 
taking must first be shown. Lewis, the distinguished author, 
in his work on Eminent Domain, after an exhaustive review 
of the decisions of the several states, lays down the general 
principle deducible therefrom to be: 
"First. All property held for public use is still subject to the 
eminent domain power of the state, with this exception: That 
it cannot be taken to be used for the same purpose in the same 
manner. *** The Legislature cannot take the property of A., 
such as a tollbridge, and transfer it to B., to be still used as a 
tollbridge by B. in the same manner as it had been previously 
used by A. This would be taking the property of A., and giving 
it to B., which the Legislature is powerless to do. 'Where there 
is no change in the use there cannot be a change in ownership 
under the law of eminent domain.' Suburban R. R. Co. v. 
Met. W. S. El. R. R. Co., 193 111. 217, 233, 61 N. E. 1090. 
This rule is a restriction upon the power of the Legislature, 
and is doubtless limited to the cases where the result of the 
act would be to transfer the property of A. to B., both being 
private individuals or corporations. *** 
Second. The right to take property already devoted to 
public use must be given in express terms or by necessary 
implication, *** and then the taking can be only to the extent 
of the necessity, and that necessity must arise from the nature 
of things over which the corporation desiring to take has no 
control, and not from a necessity created by such corporation 
for its convenience or economy." (Section 440.) 
The same author, further on in the text, says: 
"A taking which is no interference, present or prospective, 
with the prior use, is not within the rule. Consequently 
it is generally held that an easement or joint use may be 
appropriated, where the two uses are not inconsistent, and 
the second is no interference with or impairment of the 
first." (Section 441.) 
I cannot concur in the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Chief 
Justice FRICK, that, under our statutes referred to in his 
opinion, the *179 appellant may acquire a right to a 
temporary use in the respondent's tunnel, for the following 
reasons: (1) No contention is made, nor is it shown, that 
appellant has not now the same facilities to construct a tunnel 
for its mine that the respondent had to construct its tunnel. 
(2) The mere fact that appellant might more expeditiously, 
and with less expense and inconvenience to itself, develop 
and mine its ores by the use of respondent's tunnel, are not 
sufficient in law to entitle it to such use. 
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I am not unmindful that the future welfare of our 
commonwealth is largely dependent upon the development 
of the mineral resources of the state. However, as to the 
privileges to be accorded those engaged in the mining 
industry, I feel assured our legislative bodies can be depended 
upon to see to it that wise laws will be enacted, in no uncertain 
terms, to foster and encourage the highest development of 
those interests not incompatible with the private rights of the 
citizen. It may be that some future legislative body of our 
state will take occasion to say, expressly or impliedly, by 
legislative enactment, that the miner who oftentimes ventures 
his all in delving into the mountain-side in search for precious 
metals has no rights that his neighbors are bound to respect; 
that his neighbor may stand quietly by until such time as 
will be best suited to his own personal convenience and 
economy, and then be placed on an equality with respect 
to enjoyment of property rights with the one who has had 
the energy and courage to actually develop the resources of 
the state, by invoking the power of eminent domain through 
the medium of the courts; but, until the Legislature has so 
spoken in no uncertain terms, in my humble opinion the courts 
of the state should deny such privileges. The mere fact that 
the law of eminent domain has been amended and extended 
in recent years in many particulars relative to the mining 
interests, in a way calculated to foster and encourage the 
development of the mineral resources of the state, does not, 
in my judgment, warrant the courts in assuming that, under 
any and all circumstances, the privileges accorded may be 
held and enjoyed by mine owners in common. Similar rights 
sought for by appellant in this action were before the courts 
of California in Amador, etc., M. Co. v. De Witt, 73 Cal. 
482,15 Pac. 74, and of Idaho in Headrick v. Larson, 152 Fed. 
93, 81 C. C. A. 317, and in both of these jurisdictions they 
were denied under similar statutes to our own. The hazards 
and uncertainties of mining, in my judgment, render a joint 
occupancy and use of a mining tunnel so impractical that 
it would be impossible for any court to fix and determine 
with any degree of certainty the terms and conditions under 
which a joint use could be had on any hypothesis that 
would be just and equitable, and no attempt ought to be 
made except in cases of extreme necessity. To construe our 
statutes as extending the right of eminent domain beyond 
cases of extreme necessity would very materially retard the 
development of our mineral resources rather than encourage 
their development. It is a matter of common knowledge 
that immense sums of private money are being continually 
expended in the construction of tunnels for the purpose of 
demonstrating the character and extent of mineral deposits in 
the hope of some private gain. Some are successful, others 
result in failure and a total financial loss. In either event the 
burdens are met by those who have taken the initiative. If 
successful, they should be permitted to enjoy their property 
rights without interference of those who have stood by until 
such a time that they may advantageously invoke the law of 
eminent domain and secure for themselves, without hazarding 
their money, the same advantages and benefits with those 
who have, by their capital and enterprise, made it possible for 
them to do that. The trial court, in deciding the case at bar, 
had before it all of the testimony offered by the appellant, 
and, while it did not make specific findings the effect of the 
judgment was to deny the right sought for by appellant. Had 
the court made specific findings negativing appellant's right 
the result would have been precisely the same, and therefore 
the failure of the trial court to do so becomes immaterial. 
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court was right and 
should be affirmed. 
McCARTY, J. I concur in the reasoning of, and in the 
conclusions reached by, Mr. Justice CORFMAN, J. 
On Application for Rehearing. 
FRICK, C. J. 
Respondents' counsel have filed a petition for a rehearing. 
While a number of grounds are stated in the petition, yet 
nothing really new is advanced. 
Counsel, in their brief, however, argue with much vigor 
that the decision, if permitted to stand, will have disastrous 
results for many reasons. Indeed, the arguments advanced, 
in their nature and essence, differ little from those advanced 
in opposition to the decisions in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 
113, 24 L. Ed. 77; Highland Boy Mining Co. v. Strickley, 
28 Utah, 215, 78 Pac. 296, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 976, 107 Am. 
St. Rep. 711, 3 Ann. Cas. 1110, affirmed in 200 U. S. 527, 
26 Sup. Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174; Nash v. 
Clark, 27 Utah, 158, 75 Pac. 371, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 208, 
101 Am. St. Rep. 953, 1 Ann. Cas. 300, affirmed in 198 U. 
S. 361, 25 Sup. Ct. 676, 49 L. Ed. 1085, 4 Ann. Cas. 1171; 
Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394; Overman S. M. 
Co. v. Corcoran, 15 Nev. 147; *180 Butte A. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. Montana U. Ry. Co., 16 Mont. 504, 41 Pac. 232, 31 L. R. 
A. 298,50 Am. St. Rep. 508; Ellinghouse v. Taylor, 19 Mont. 
468, 48 Pac. 757; Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga. 
419; Tanner v. Canal Co., 40 Utah, 105, 121 Pac. 584; and 
Salt Lake City v. Irrigation Co., 40 Utah, 126, 121 Pac. 592. 
While the decisions in some of the foregoing cases are merely 
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analogous to the case at bar, those in the others, and especially 
those in the mining cases, practically cover the same ground 
that is covered by the case at bar. When the decisions in those 
cases were first announced no doubt the consequences were 
quite as startling to contemplate to many as counsel assert the 
"consequences are *** startling to contemplate" in the case at 
bar. We assert, however, with the utmost confidence, that the 
doctrine announced in the case at bar is in perfect harmony 
with the doctrine announced in the foregoing cases. 
It is contended, however, that if the decision prevails "any 
railroad company having a line of road, such, for instance, as 
the one between Salt Lake City and Park City, or between Salt 
Lake City and Wendover, may be used in common with the 
present owners so long as the necessity or convenience of the 
condemning road might demand. To the objection that such a 
use was in reality a taking of the road to all practical intents 
and purposes, the answer would be that, so long as it was open 
to the use of the real owner to the extent of his demands, the 
court would see to it that any other railroad company might 
have a common or joint use up to the limit of its capacity." The 
foregoing, no doubt, are some of the consequences which, to 
counsels' minds, are "startling to contemplate." Let us assure 
counsel and all other timid persons that no such startling 
consequences can or will result from the decision. Indeed, 
in this state it would be utterly impossible to bring about 
such consequences. Our Constitution has made that quite 
unnecessary. In section 12 of article 12 of our Constitution it 
is provided: 
"All railroad and other transportation 
companies are declared to be common 
carriers, and subject to legislative control; and 
such companies shall receive and transport 
each other's passengers and freight without 
discrimination or unnecessary delay." 
The necessity of condemning a joint or use in common of a 
railroad can, therefore, never arise in this state for the mere 
purpose of transporting freight or passengers, even though 
the law permitted one enterprise to condemn the easement 
of another for mere speculative purposes. The necessity for 
condemning a joint use may, perhaps, arise in some instances 
for terminal purposes. When it arises, however, it no doubt 
will be limited to the actual necessities of the condemning 
company, and the matter may then be judicially determined. 
There is little doubt that if the principle that is embodied in 
the section of our Constitution which we have quoted had 
been announced at any time prior to the decision of Munn 
v. Illinois, supra, which was announced in 1876, it would 
have been more startling to very many persons than is the 
decision in the case at bar. Counsel's fears regarding what 
might happen to our railroads are therefore groundless. 
It is also suggested that under the decision as it stands one 
mine owner might be permitted to condemn a joint use of a 
mine shaft. This suggestion, it seems to us, is made for the 
purpose of showing that the decision is impractical and hence 
unsound. Such a suggestion is, however, not justified by 
anything that is said in the opinion nor by anything contained 
in our statute. There always is, and of necessity must be, 
connected with every mine shaft in operation a certain 
amount of machinery and appliances. There is nothing in our 
statute authorizing the condemnation of mine machinery or 
appliances. It might with as much force be contended that 
because the joint use of the tracks of one railroad company 
may be condemned for a limited purpose a joint use of its 
machinery, tracks, cars, depots, depot offices, and warehouses 
may therefore be condemned. Such a result does not at all 
follow, and the joint use really contemplated by the statute 
should not be denied merely because it is assumed that the 
doctrine might be carried too far. It may well be, however, that 
an abandoned mine shaft, or one no longer in use, from which 
the owner has removed his machinery and appliances, could 
be the subject of condemnation. These matters are, however, 
not now involved except for the purpose of illustration, and 
hence are not and cannot be decided. 
It is further insisted that no rule regarding the measure of 
damages is laid down in the opinion. As indicated in the 
decision, no hard and fast rule can be promulgated in that 
respect. It cannot be determined in advance what method 
for the ascertainment of compensation should be adopted in 
all cases. Whether payment should be made on the basis 
of tonnage, or by the day or month, or otherwise, must 
be determined by the court from the evidence of experts, 
of whose knowledge and experience courts constantly avail 
themselves. Many of the elements arising in joint or common 
use of property are suggested in the case of Salt Lake City v. 
Irrigation Co., supra. If the experience of experts is followed, 
no great difficulty, if any at all, can arise in that regard. 
But we are also told that we have not defined what constitutes 
necessity in such cases. That, too, is largely a question to 
be determined in each case. We have stated the facts as 
they appear from the evidence, and from those facts we 
did all that could be done in the opinion, namely, state our 
conclusion, which is that the facts constitute a prima facie 
case of necessity in a case like the one at bar. 
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It is also asserted that the decision will retard rather than 
stimulate the development * 181 of mining property, because 
it will permit one mine owner to divide the use of his tunnels, 
and will thus tend to discourage the construction of mine 
tunnels. That is certainly a gloomy view to take of the matter. 
Why should men refuse to develop their own mining property 
simply because another, by making adequate compensation, 
may, for a limited time and to a limited extent, use what the 
owner cannot use? 
The argument, as we understand it, is based upon the theory 
that the tunnel belongs to the owner, and that no one should 
be permitted to interfere, and if, forsooth, the law permits 
such interference, even for adequate compensation and for 
a limited time only, tunnels will no longer be run into our 
mountains. Everyone knows, however, that in any event the 
instances where the necessity exists for one mine owner to 
condemn a joint use of another's tunnel are not numerous; 
but, even though they were, no one would refuse to develop 
a promising mining property merely because some one, after 
making adequate compensation to the owner, might be given 
the right to a joint use of the tunnel for a limited time under 
the direction and supervision of a court of justice. All of us 
acquire and hold much of our property subject to the right 
of eminent domain, yet no one refuses either to acquire or to 
improve his property because of that fact. Counsel's fears in 
that respect are quite as groundless as they are in all other 
respects. 
Finally, it is insisted that the opinion in many respects is vague 
and uncertain. Indeed, counsel who have filed the petition 
contend that they are unable to grasp either its meaning 
or its purpose. If it were not for the fact that counsel on 
the other side have found no difficulty whatever to fully 
comprehend all that is said and all that is decided in the 
opinion we might regard the contention as more serious. 
The contention is, however, one that is frequently found 
in applications for rehearings. The attorney who loses the 
case can rarely be reconciled to a decision which is strongly 
contrary to his contentions. The zeal for his client's cause, 
which is commendable if kept within bounds, prevents him 
from seeing what others see and from understanding what 
others readily understand. 
The application for a rehearing in this case differs from the 
applications in ordinary cases only in that this case is perhaps 
of greater importance than the ordinary case and in that the 
decision is by a divided court. That, however, standing alone, 
is not sufficient reason why the decision should not stand. 
The majority of this court must assume the responsibility for 
a decision, and, after having fully considered the questions 
presented in the application for a rehearing and the arguments 
from every point, we see no good reason why the opinion 
should not be adhered to. 
The petition for a rehearing is therefore denied. 
THURMAN and GIDEON, JJ., concur. 
McCARTY and CORFMAN, JJ., dissenting. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
POSTAL TEL. CABLE CO. OF UTAH 
v. 
OREGON S. L. R. CO. 
May io, 1901. 
Appeal from district court, Salt Lake county; A. N. Cherry, 
Judge. 
Action by the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of Utah, 
a corporation, against the Oregon Short-Line Railroad 
Company, a corporation. From a judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
*736 P. L. Williams, for appellant. 
Powers, Straup & Lippman, for respondent. 
Opinion 
HALL, District Judge. 
In this case it appears that on the 14th day of July, 
1899, certain citizens of Utah, in connection with the 
assistant superintendent and the general counsel of the Postal 
Telegraph Cable Company, a corporation organized under 
the laws of New York, proceeded to organize under the laws 
of Utah the respondent herein, the Postal Telegraph Cable 
Company of Utah. Ten per cent, of the capital stock of the 
Utah corporation was paid in, the money being furnished 
by the New York corporation. All the requirements of the 
statutes of Utah relating to the organization of corporations 
were complied with. The articles of incorporation were duly 
filed with the county clerk of Salt Lake county, and a certified 
copy of the same was filed with the secretary of state of 
Utah, who issued his certificate, as required by law, certifying 
that the respondent had complied with the provisions of the 
statutes and that it was duly incorporated. The directors of 
the respondent met and formally organized, directed that 
negotiations be had with appellant for a right of way to 
construct a telegraph line along its railroad right of way from 
Salt Lake City north to the Idaho state line, and adopted 
a resolution selecting the right of way, and also proceeded 
to accept the provisions of an act of congress, approved 
July 24, 1866, entitled "An act to aid in the construction of 
W^:t*5-K:>'Mffivt" : : tf^ O f H O T h n m r - ^ n D o . .fnrr> Kf/-% r^l^l^y * „ *r\~ 
telegraph lines and to secure to the government the use of 
the same for postal and military and other purposes." Failing 
in its negotiations, respondent commenced this proceeding 
under the eminent domain act of Utah to condemn a right 
of way for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and 
operating its telegraph line upon the right of way of the 
appellant longitudinally, from Salt Lake City north, through 
the counties of Salt Lake, Davis, Weber, Box Elder, and 
Cache, in this state, to the state line of Utah and Idaho,-a total 
distance of about 100 miles. In its complaint the respondent 
set forth the character of the construction of the telegraph 
line designed, the length of the poles, their size at the base, 
the depth that they would be planted in the ground, their 
distance from the railroad track, and the size of the cross-
arms upon which wires are proposed to be strung. It was 
also alleged in the complaint that, when crossing the track of 
appellant, the wires would be strung high enough for safety, 
and that on reasonable notice from appellant, when it was 
necessary, the poles would be moved to such a point as the 
appellant might designate. The distance of the poles from 
each other and the amount of ground each would occupy 
was alleged; the general route and termini were described; 
the necessity for the taking, and the failure of the parties to 
come to terms were set forth; and the fact that the telegraph 
line would not interfere with the appellant's business was 
stated, as well as other allegations not necessary here to 
repeat. The defendant demurred to the complaint upon two 
grounds: (1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject-
matter of the action, so far as the same is situated outside of 
Salt Lake county and within the counties of Davis, Weber, 
Box Elder, and Cache, respectively; (2) that the complaint 
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 
After argument the demurrer was overruled by the lower 
court, and the appellant answered, denying the incorporation 
of respondent, and basing its defense principally upon an 
allegation that the respondent is the agent and under the 
control of the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of New York, 
a foreign corporation, which has not the power to exercise 
the right of eminent domain in this state, and which, through 
the organization of respondent, is seeking to do by indirection 
that which it cannot accomplish in its own name directly, and 
that in reality respondent has no separate existence from the 
Postal Telegraph Cable Company of New York. The case was 
tried in the district court without a jury, and the court found 
the issues for *737 the respondent, assessing appellant's 
damages at $100. 
The contention of the appellant that the lower court had 
no jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, so far as 
the same is included within the counties of Davis, Weber, 
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Box Elder, and Cache, respectively, is not tenable. The thing 
which is sought by respondent by this proceeding is an 
entirety. Railroad Co. v. Gough, 29 Kan. 94; Lower Kings 
River Water-Ditch Co. v. Kings River & F. Canal Co., 60 
Cal. 408; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 475; St. Louis & C. R. Co. 
v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 530, 51 N. E. 382. The damage 
which defendant is entitled to is for the whole property, and 
the cause of action arises in all five counties as a unit. The 
county lines crossing the right of way of appellant do not 
destroy the singleness of its use. Neither does it negative the 
fact that all the land constitutes but one right of way. As is 
said in Lewis, Em. Dom. § 475, in defining what constitutes 
an entire tract: "In general, it is so much as belongs to the 
same proprietor as that taken, and is contiguous to it or used 
together for a common purpose." Our statute upon the subject 
of eminent domain provides, among other things, as follows: 
"All proceedings under this chapter must be brought in the 
district court for the county in which the property or some 
part thereof is situated." This provision does not conflict with 
section 5, art. 8, of our constitution, which provides that "all 
civil and criminal business arising in any county must be 
tried in such county." Irrigation Co. v. Mclntyre, 16 Utah, 
368, 52 Pac. 628. As said by this court in the case cited, 
the words of our constitution mean "that an action affecting 
realty shall be tried in the county where the business or 
the cause arises, or, if the cause of action arises in more 
counties than one, then in either of said counties." Part of 
the right of way sought being in Salt Lake county, and being 
an entirety extending through the other counties named, the 
respondent under our law clearly had the right to include the 
whole in one proceeding. By so doing it avoided bringing 
five different cases in five different courts in five different 
counties to condemn the identical right of way against the 
same defendant. 
It is objected that the complaint does not so describe the lands 
or premises which respondent asks to have appropriated to 
its use that it can be definitely described in a judgment. The 
complaint asks for a right of way upon the railroad right 
of way between certain named termini within certain named 
counties in the state, and describes the amount of ground 
needed for each pole, the distance of the poles from each 
other, and their distance from the railroad track. When the 
object in the condemnation case is to secure a right of way 
through a farm or legal subdivision, it probably should be 
described by such subdivision; but this is for a right of way 
on an established railroad right of way, the locus of which 
is accurately fixed by survey, of which there are accessible 
records. It would seem that there can be no difficulty in so 
framing a judgment, with such description of the land taken, 
that parties may know where it is. A railroad track is a fixed 
monument. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburg, Ft. W. 
& C. Ry. Co., 71 111. 40. From this fixed monument other 
distances may be measured, and there does not appear to be 
any difficulty in locating exactly the line of construction to be 
followed by this telegraph company. The complaint describes 
the property upon which the respondent proposes to locate 
its telegraph line as the railway of appellant from Salt Lake 
City to Cannon Station, on the state line between Utah and 
Idaho. It alleges that the railroad bed is located near the center 
of its right of way, which is not less than 100 feet in width; 
that the railroad track is 4 feet 8 Yz inches gauge, and upon 
the center of the railroad bed; that the telegraph line to be 
constructed will consist of poles 30 feet in length, planted 
firmly in the ground at a depth of not less than 5 feet, and 30 
feet from the outer edge of the railroad track; that the poles 
will be erected at a distance of 167 feet from each other on 
the right of way; that each pole will be 1 foot in diameter at 
the base and will occupy only 1 square foot of ground; that no 
wires will be attached to appellant's fixtures, nor poles erected 
upon embankments, nor will the wires interfere with any other 
telegraph line; that the wires are to be attached to cross-arms 
high enough so that they will not interfere with appellant's 
property or business; and that the cross-arms will be 8 feet in 
length. This description covers every reasonable intendment 
of the statute. 
It is also insisted by appellant that the respondent is not a 
corporation either de jure or de facto. The respondent appears 
to have complied fully with the laws of Utah. Its incorporators 
entered into the required articles of agreement. They attached 
the statutory oath. Ten per cent, of the capital stock was 
paid to its treasurer in cash. The articles were filed with 
the county clerk of the proper county. A certified copy of 
the articles was filed with the secretary of state, and the 
secretary of state issued his certificate of incorporation. It has 
performed corporate acts. It adopted a seal, and its officers 
have transacted corporate business. Clearly it is a corporation, 
and, being such, it is a legal entity. Exchange Bank of Macon 
v. Macon Const. Co., 97 Ga. 1, 25 S. E. 326; Richmond & 
I. Const. Co. v. Richmond, N. J. & B. R. Co., 15 C. C. A. 
289, 68 Fed. 105, 34 L. R. A. 625. It is a citizen of Utah 
(Wilson v. Mining Co., 19 Utah, 66, 56 Pac. 300), and by 
subdivision 8 of section 3588, Rev. St., it is granted the right 
to exercise the power of eminent domain. It may be true 
that the Postal Telegraph Cable Company *738 of New 
York is interested in respondent; but that fact does not devest 
from respondent any of the corporate powers with which it 
is clothed. There is nothing in the letter, spirit, or policy of 
the law which prohibits the same persons from forming and 
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conducting two or more different corporations. This same 
question was before the United States circuit court for the 
district of Idaho (see Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Oregon S. L. R. 
Co., 104 Fed. 623) in a case upon all fours with the one at bar, 
and the court said: "The next objection is that plaintiff is not 
a corporation and is not organized in good faith. No one will 
doubt that the organization of plaintiff was for the purpose 
of co-operation with the Postal Telegraph Cable Company of 
New York. It may be said that it is subordinate to the latter, 
and is to assist it in carrying out its objects. It may be nothing 
more than an agent. This may be said of it more from general 
circumstances than from the testimony in the case. This, 
however, is a common procedure with all large corporation. A 
recent instance is in mind. A railroad company, now operating 
in North Idaho, desiring to add a branch of about five miles, 
organized an independent company to build the same; and 
I think this defendant, in building the branch railroad from 
Nampa to Boise, did the same. It seems not an unusual matter 
for a large corporation to utilize small corporations for their 
purpose. If the plaintiff, however, is organized for a fraudulent 
purpose, the court will not lend its aid in the consummation 
of any fraud; but this I am unable to find against the plaintiff 
from the evidence. The facts are that it appears by the record to 
have organized according to the statutes. It has held corporate 
meetings and performed corporate acts. It has not built any 
telegraph line within the territory for which it was organized; 
but it is for the privilege of doing that in the place it deems 
most available and best for its use that it is now in this forum. 
Until it is clearly shown that this organization is based upon 
fraud, or that it is for some fraudulent purpose, the court 
must regard it as organized in good faith, and accede to it 
accordingly the statutory rights accorded it." These views are 
fully sustained by the following authorities: Cunningham v. 
City of Cleveland, 39 C. C. A. 211, 98 Fed. 657; Lowler v. 
Railroad Co., 59 Iowa, 563, 13 N. W. 718; Day v. Telegraph 
Co., 66 Md. 354, 7 Atl. 608; In re New York, L. & W. Ry. 
Co., 35 Hun, 220; Id., 99 N. Y. 12, 1 N. E. 27; Com. v. New 
York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 132 Pa. 591, 19 Atl. 291; Frost v. 
Coal Co., 24 How. 278, 16 L. Ed. 637. 
However, the authority of respondent to exercise the power 
of eminent domain cannot be considered in this proceeding. 
While the burden of proving its corporate existence was by 
the denial in the answer placed upon respondent, it was only 
necessary that it prove that it was a corporation de facto. 
Dry-Goods Co. v. Box, 13 Utah, 629, 45 Pac. 629. Having 
made such proof, its corporate existence cannot be inquired 
into collaterally. Marsh v. Mathias, 19 Utah, 350, 56 Pac. 
1074. And this proceeding to condemn a right of way is a 
collateral proceeding so far as it concerns the question of the 
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corporate existence of respondent. Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. v. 
Peoria & F. Ry. Co., 105 111. 110; Wellington & P. R. Co. 
v. Cashie & C. R. & Lumber Co., 114 N. C. 690, 19 S. E. 
646; Turnpike Co. v. Bobb, 88 Ky. 226,10 S. W. 794; Golden 
Gate Mill & Min. Co. v. Joshua Hendy Mach. Works, 82 
Cal. 184, 23 Pac. 45. And it may be stated as a general rule 
that the legal existence of a de facto corporation can only be 
questioned by the state in a direct proceeding instituted for 
that purpose. Reisner v. Strong, 24 Kan. 411; Independent 
Order of Foresters v. United Order of Foresters, 94 Wis. 234, 
68 N. W. 1011; Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & E. 
R. Co., 112 111. 601; Mortgage Co. v. Tennille (Ga.) 13 S. E. 
158,12 L. R. A. 529; Stout v. Zulick (N. J. Err. & App.) 7 Atl. 
362; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 
1113,29 L. Ed. 319; National Docks Ry. Co. v. Central R. Co. 
of New Jersey, 32 N. J. Eq. 755, 760; Rex v. Corporation of 
Carmarthen, 2 Burrows, 869. In the case of Ward v. Railroad 
Co., 119 111. 287,10 N. E. 365, the court says: "There is some 
proof that the petitioner is a corporation de facto, and that is 
all the law requires in this class of cases. There is evidence, 
although it may be slight, of corporate acts done by petitioner. 
It appears that an engineer has been appointed, the line of the 
proposed road has been located, and other steps taken towards 
the building of the road. *** These are corporate acts, and 
tend to show that petitioner is a corporation de facto." See, 
also, Colorado E. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 41 
Fed. 297; Smith v. Sheely, 12 Wall. 358,20 L. Ed. 430. 
That the telegraph is a public use, and the business of 
telegraphy is obviously a public business, is well established. 
It is a quasi public employment,-one not merely exercised 
for the purpose of private gain, but for the general benefit 
and welfare of the community. A telegraph company is a 
public servant, which must serve all alike who make demands 
upon it, and its right to exercise the power of eminent domain 
is recognized by our statutes and by numerous decisions of 
the courts. Rev. St. § 3588, subsec. 8; Joyce, Electric Law, 
§ 274; Lewis, Em. Dom. § 172. The use, then, to which 
respondent seeks to apply the land to be condemned is a public 
use, recognized by law. It is, however, contended that the 
land sought is already devoted to a public use, and that the 
condemnation for telegraph purposes will not be devoting it to 
more necessary public use. The land which respondent seeks 
to condemn is not now used for any purpose. Practically it is 
now idle *739 property, and the new use promises to be one 
of public utility. The appropriation of the right of way of a 
railroad not essential to the enjoyment of its franchises and 
property, for the construction of a telegraph line, is to and for a 
more necessary public use. Southern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Southern 
Cal. Ry. Co., I l l Cal. 231, 43 Pac. 602. 
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It is also argued that no necessity has been shown to exist 
for the taking of the right of way. But it is shown that the 
respondent made a bona fide effort to agree with the appellant 
upon terms for the taking of the land sought, and that the latter 
refused to consider respondent's proposition or to negotiate 
with it at all. The necessity, therefore, exists for the taking. 
It is not a question whether there is other land to be had 
that is equally available, but the question is whether the land 
sought is needed for the construction of the public work. The 
necessity is shown to exist when it appears that it is necessary 
to take the land by condemnation proceedings in order to 
effectuate the purposes of the corporation. Railroad Co. v. 
Kip, 46 N. Y. 553,7 Am. Rep. 385; Railroad Co. v. Brainard, 
9 N. Y. 110. The respondent has the right to determine when 
and where its telegraph line shall be built. It may be said 
to be a general rule that, unless a corporation exercising the 
power of eminent domain acts in bad faith or is guilty of 
oppression, its discretion in the selection of land will not be 
interfered with. Railway Co. v. Petty, 57 Ark. 359, 21 S. W. 
884; Englewood Connecting R. Co. v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., 
117 111. 611,6 N. E. 684; O'Hare v. Railroad Co., 139 111. 151, 
28 N. E. 923; Stark v. Railroad Co., 43 Iowa, 501; Peavey v. 
Railroad Co., 30 Me. 498; Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Oil 
Colony & F. R. R. Co., 5 Allen, 221; Railroad Co. v. Stoddard, 
6 Minn. 150 (Gil. 92); Dietrichs v. Railroad Co., 13 Neb. 361, 
13 N. W. 624; Railroad Co. v. Speer, 56 Pa. 325; Colorado 
E. Ry. Co. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 41 Fed. 293; New 
York Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gaslight Co., 5 
Hun, 201. With the degree of necessity or the extent which 
the property will advance the public purpose, the courts have 
nothing to do. Tracy v. Railroad Co., 80 Ky. 259; In re New 
York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 77 N. Y. 248; Railroad Co. v. 
Hooper, 76 Cal. 404, 18 Pac. 599. When the use is public, 
the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular 
property is not a subject of judicial cognizance. Boom Co. v. 
Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 406, 25 L. Ed. 206; St. Louis, H. & 
K. C. Ry. v. Hannibal Union Depot Co., 125 Mo. 82, 28 S. 
W. 483. 
It is contended by appellant that the respondent had no power 
to locate its telegraph line longitudinally upon appellant's 
right of way, because, when the lands have been once taken, 
by virtue of the power of eminent domain or otherwise, 
and appropriated to a public use, as is the right of way in 
controversy, such land cannot again be subjected to another 
public use, unless such secondary appropriation be authorized 
by the legislature. The authorities, however affirm that this 
rule only applies when the second public use, by reason of 
its nature or character, necessarily supersedes or destroys the 
>,.i.-.,* /zs o /n^o T< —. r-> .^ ,i—v«.^  M ~ ~!^-.:.—, +~ ^ ^ ; ^ ; 
former use. Where, as in this case, the construction of the 
telegraph line will not materially interfere with the use of 
appellant's land for railroad purposes, it is clear that the rule 
does not apply. Baltimore & O. S. W. R Co. v. Board of 
Com'rs (Ind. Sup.) 58 N. E. 837; Gold v. Railway Co., 153 
Ind. 232, 53 N. E. 285; Steele v. Empsom, 142 Ind. 397, 41 
N. E. 822; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Southern Cal. Ry. Co., 111 
Cal. 221,43 Pac. 602; Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone 
Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 52 S. W. 106; 
St. Louis & C. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 521, 51 N. 
E. 382. Mr. Lewis, in his work on Eminent Domain (section 
269), says: "A telegraph line may be established along a 
railroad right of way, it being no material interference with 
the use thereof for railroad purposes." And this is undoubtedly 
the law. A telegraph line, constructed as proposed, will not, in 
the nature of things, interfere with the operation of appellant's 
railroad. 
The certificate of the postmaster general of the United States, 
showing the acceptance by respondent of the provisions of 
the act of congress of July 24, 1866, entitled "An act to aid 
in the construction of telegraph lines and to secure to the 
government the use of the same for postal, military, and other 
purposes," was properly admitted in evidence. By accepting 
the provisions of this act, respondent is given the right to 
erect its telegraph lines upon all post roads; and by section 
3964 of the Revised Statutes of the United States all railroads 
are made post roads. But, before respondent can exercise 
the right thus granted by congress, it must have fixed and 
paid to the appellant just compensation for the easement. 
This is ascertained by resorting to the state law relative to 
eminent domain. The state law becomes auxiliary to the act 
of congress, and provides the method of condemnation and 
compensation. In other words, a right is given by this act of 
congress, and the remedy is furnished by the laws of the state. 
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Southern Pac. R. Co. (C. C.) 89 Fed. 
190; Gilmer v. Lime Point, 18 Cal. 229; Postal Tel. Cable Co. 
v. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co., 49 La. Ann. 58,21 
South. 183; Smith v. Drew, 5 Mass. 513; Rogers v. Bradshaw, 
20 Johns. 735-744; Kohl v. U. S., 91 U. S. 373,23 L. Ed. 449; 
Suth. St. Const. § 399. 
It is also claimed that the lower court erred in the rule as to 
the measure of damages which it adopted. It is insisted that 
the value of the property taken should be measured by the 
most advantageous use to which it could be put. That rule 
is undoubtedly correct where one owns property *740 in 
fee and may put it to any use which he chooses; but it is 
not the rule, as in this case, where the railroad right of way 
can only be devoted to railroad uses. Even though the award 
~ ~ f i I C r ^ w ^ ^ r v * ^ . * \A/^rrL'C- A 
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be nominal, if the sum awarded is a full and fair equivalent 
for the thing taken, it is just compensation. In the case of 
a railroad company whose right of way is held for railroad 
purposes, it is not a question as to what the property would 
be worth to the most advantageous use to which it could be 
put; but the question is, how much will the land be damaged 
for railroad purposes by the erection of the telegraph line? St. 
Louis & C. E. R. Co. v. Postal Tel. Co., 173 111. 508, 51 N. 
E. 382; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 149 111. 
457, 37 N. E. 78; Id., 166 U. S. 226, 17 Sup. Ct. 581, 38 L. 
Ed. 819. The railroad company holds its right of way strictly 
for railroad purposes, and is restricted in its use of the same 
for such purposes. Under this view of the estate which the 
railroad company has in its right of way, it is difficult to see 
how the damage from the erection of a telegraph line can be 
more than nominal. Evidence was introduced by appellant to 
show damages from the added expense of burning grass from 
the right of way by reason of the erection of telegraph poles; 
but such damages are too remote. Southwestern Telegraph & 
Telephone Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 
52 S. W. 107. Neither can damages be allowed for imaginary 
dangers. Jones v. Railroad Co., 68 111. 380; Railroad Co. v. 
Lamb, 11 Neb. 592, 10 N. W. 493; Chicago & N. W. Ry. 
Co. v. Town of Cicero, 157 111. 48, 41 N. E. 640; Lockie v. 
Telegraph Co., 103 111. 401. Where, as in this case, a telegraph 
company has a right under the statutes to condemn a right of 
way on the right of way of a railroad, the damages to be paid to 
the railroad company are nominal, in as much as the railroad 
company only owns a right of way, and such a right of way is 
not interfered with by the telegraph company. Railroad Co. v. 
Catholic Bishop, 119 111. 529, 10 N. E. 372; Hilcoat v. Bird, 
10 C. B. 327; Allen v. City of Boston, 137 Mass. 319; In re 
Albany St., 11 Wend. 149, 25 Am. Dec. 618; Chicago, B. & 
Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U. S. 258,17 Sup. Ct. 992, 
38 L.Ed. 819. 
We find no error in the record, and the judgment of the lower 
court must be affirmed, with costs. 
BARTCH and BASKIN, JJ., concur. 
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OUTSIDE OF 26* ROW) 
\ 
S 88-24'31- iy> 
33.46' 
26* ROW DESCRIPTION \ 
Beginning at a point which is on the westerly right of way 
fence of Interstate 15. said point being North, 571.83 feet 
and West, 1401.18 feet from the Eost Quarter Corner of 
Section 34, Township 6 South, Range 2 East, Sait Lake 
Base and Meridian; and running thence South 88'24'31' West, 
along Quit Claim Deed Entry 23994 Book 2240 at Page 562 
a distance of 33.46 feet to a point which is parallel to ond 
twenty six (26') feet westerly of the afore mentioned. 1-15 
right of woy fence; thence North 40'35'53' West, 696.63 
feet to a point on the northerly line of the afore mentioned 
Quit aaim Deed; thence North 72%0T30' East, 28.19 feet to 
a point on the afore mentioned fence line; thence South 
40'35'53m East. 706.80 feet to the point of beginning. 
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a843* s 1107. The private property which may be Private prop-
ader this Chapter includes: 
All real property belonging to any person. 
Lands belonging to this Territory, or to any county, 
Eorated city, village or town, not appropriated to some 
,use. 
Property appropriated to public use; but such prop-
Shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public 
that to which it has been already appropriated. 
Franchises for toll-roads, toll-bridges and ferries, 
111 other franchises; but such franchise shall not be 
unless for free highways, railroads, or , other more 
sary public use. 
p § . All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned 
ction 1105, and any and ail structures and improvements 
fpn, and the lands held or used in connection therewith, 
f be subject to be connected with, crossed, or intersected 
|ny other right of way or improvements or structures 
|bn. They shall also be subject to a limited use in com-
I with the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses 
jpFOssings, intersections and connections, shall be made in 
igier most compatible with the greatest public benefit and 
I private injury. 
t$. All classes of private property not enumerated; may 
aken for public use, when such taking is authorized by 
§ 3844. s 1108. Before property can be taken it must Facts neces-
a sary to be 
^a r ! found by court 
B-: i rt\i before con-
% -l. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use demnation. 
forked by law. 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use. 
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the 
iplic use to which it is to be applied is a more necessary 
"lie use. 
3845. s 1109. In all cases where land is required f or parties may 
p c use, the Territory or its agents in charge of such use, ^ ^ t o t T i 
*~ survey and locate the same; but it must be located in the i n a k e BTliyeyB' 
fter which wil l b e mos t compatible wi th the g rea te s t p u b -
I p o d and the least private injury, and subject to the pro-
l e s pf this Chapter. The Territory or its agents in 
* of such public use, may enter upon the land and make 
lunat ions , surveys, and maps thereof, and such entry 
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"•^bini of the extent to which it would 
"iWd or raised. 
*• v Salt Lake City, 44 U. 204; 138 P. 
f companies may condemn ground for a 
-:--"s|tef etc., but cannot condemn any por-
"bf'a right-of-way used for railroad pur-
"-• even though a track departs from a 
<.'of-way, it cannot be approached so close 
% interfere with traffic, and five feet is not. 
^Unreasonable minimum distance. 
JStcbum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal 
" --50 U. —» 168 P. 86. 
Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining 
generally and development of the mines and 
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a 
mining company has driven • a tunnel going 
through a claim owned by another company, 
and does not, in its own operation, use the 
tunnel to its full capacity, the company own-
ing the claim may condemn a right to use the 
tunnel jointly to work its claim. 
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con., 50 
U. —; 174 P . 172. 
55^7331. (3589.) Estates and rights subject to condemnation. The fol-
it^ving is a classification of the estates and rights in lands, subject to be taken 
jjjjfirpublic use: 
' 1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for per-
g^nent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned 
Sereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tail-
|§gs of a mine, mill, smelter, or other place for the reduction of ores; 
' 2. An easement, when taken for any other use; 
' 3 . The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, and the right to 
llSfee therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be neces-
s^afy for some public use. 
•"CaL C. Civ. P. , § 1239*. 
7332. (3590.) Property subject to condemnation. The private prop-
\ erty which may be taken under this chapter includes: . 
1. All real property belonging to any person; 
2. Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, or incorporated city 
J or town, not appropriated to some public use; 
. 3. Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property 
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which 
it has been already appropriated; 
4. Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other franchises; 
provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for free highways, 
railroads, or other more necessary public use; 
5. All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in § 7330, and 
any and all structures and improvements thereon, and the lands held or.used 
in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or 
intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon; 
they shall also be subject to a limited use in common with the owners thereof, 
when necessary; but such uses of crossings, intersections, and connections 
shall be made in the manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit 
and the least private injury; 
6. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for pub-
lic use when such taking is authorized by law. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1240*. 
Property and franchises of private corpora-
tions subject to eminent domain, Con. a r t 12, 
sec. 11. 
Decisions on property subject to condemna-
tion, note to § 7330. 
Under the provisions of §§ 7330, 7332, mining 
generally and development of the mines and 
mineral deposits is a public use, and where a 
7333. (3591.) Conditions precedent to condemnation. Before property 
can be taken it must appear; 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law; 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use; 
3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
Cal. C. Civ. P., § 1241. 
7334. (3592.) Right to enter to make survey, etc. Damage. In all 
cases where land is required for public use, the person or corporation, or his 
or its agents, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it 
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the great-
est public good and the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of 
mining company has driven a tunnel going 
through a claim owned by another company, 
and does not, in its own operation, use the 
tunnel to its full capacity, the company own-
ing the claim may condemn a right to use the 
tunnel jointly to. work its claim. 
Monataire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall Con. 
M. Co., 50 U. —; 174 P. 172. 
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104-61-3. Private Property Which May be 
Taken. 
The private property which may be taken 
under this chapter includes: 
(1) All real property belonging to any 
person. 
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any 
county, city or incorporated town, not appro-
priated to some public use. 
(3) Property appropriated to public use; 
provided, that such property shall not be taken 
unless for a more necessary public use than 
that to which it has been already appropriated. 
(4) Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, 
ferries, and all other franchises; provided, that 
such franchises shall not be taken unless for 
free highways, railroads, or other more neces-
sary public use. 
(5) All rights of way for any and all pur-
poses mentioned in section 104-61-1, and any 
and all structures and improvements thereon, and 
the lands held or used in connection therewith, 
shall be subject to be connected with, crossed or 
intersected by any other right of way or improve-
ment or structure thereon; they shall also be 
subject to a limited use in common with the own-
ers thereof, when necessary; but such uses of 
crossings, intersections and connections shall be 
made in the manner most compatible with the 
greatest public benefit and the least private in-
jury. 
(6) All classes of private property not enu-
merated may be taken for public use when such . 
taking is authorized by law. (C. L. 17, § 7332.) 
Properly and franchises of private corporations subject to 
eminent domain, Const. Art. 12, Sec 11. 
More necessary Public Use—S. L. C. Water & Electrical Power 
Co. v. Salt Lake City, 25 U. 441, 71 P. 1067; Postal Tel. 
Cable Co. v. O. S. L. By. Co., 23 U. 474, 65 P. 735. 
Joint use with owner as distinguished from dispossessing own-
er. Monetaire M. Co. v. Columbia Rexall Consolidated 
Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. 
Interest Subject To—Contracts to purchase state lands. Brigham 
City v. Rich, 34 U. 130, 97 P. 220, 4 A. L. R. 548. 
Tax Lien. O. S. L. R. R. Co. v. Hallock, 41 TJ. 378, 126 P . 394. 
Land already devoted to public use. Ketchum Coal Co. v. 
Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 U. 394, 168 P. 86. 
Easement on easement, proper. Whiterocks Irrigation Co. v. 
Mooseman, 45 U. 79, 141 P. 459; Monetaire M. Co. v. Co-
lumbia Recall Consolidated Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P . 172. 
Joint Use—Compensation and regulation prescribed according 
to rules of equity. Monetaire M. Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
Consolidated Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. See also: 
Salt Lake City v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 U. 126, 
121 P. 592. 
Railroad right of way. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley 
Coal Co., 50 U. 395, 168 P. 86. See also: Bingham & Gar-
field R. Co. v. No. Utah Mining Co. of Bingham, 49 U. 125, 
162 P. 65. . 
Rights Reserved in Owner—Right of passage across railroad 
track. Bingham & Garfield R. Co. v. No. Utah Mining Co. 
of Bingham, 49 U. 125, 162 P. 65. 
Title to Locus—Evidence of title in owner. Jordan v. Utah R. 
Co., 47 U. 519, 156 P . 939. 
Condemnor estopped to deny defendant's title. Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 U. 342, 
159 P . 737. 
Acquired by condemnor after suit commenced. Ketchum Coal 
Co. v. District Court of Carbon County, 48 U. 342, 
159 P . 737. 
[1406] 
104-61-4. Conditions Precedent to Taking. 
Before property can be taken it must appei r. > 
(1) That the use to which it is to be ap 
'plied is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the tajpng is necessary to such 
use; and, 
(3) If already appropriated to some public 
use, that the public use to which it is to be 
applied is a more necessary public use. 
(C. L. 17, § 7333.) 
104-61-5. Right of Entry for Survey, etc. 
In all cases where land is required for public 
use, the person, or his agent, in charge of such 
use may survey and locate the same; but it 
must be located in the manner which will be ^ 
most compatible with the greatest public good i 
and the least private injury, and subject to $ 
the provisions of this chapter. The person, or 
his agent, in charge of such public use may 
enter upon the land and make examinations, 
surveys and maps thereof, and such entry shali 
constitute no cause of action in favor of the ] 
owners of the lands, except for injuries result- ! 
ing from negligence, wantonness or malice. 
(C. L. 17, §7334; 
104-61-6. Venue of Action—Complaint to be| 
Verified. 
All proceedings under this chapter must be? 
brought in the district court for the county ig£ 
which the property or some part thereof is siij 
uated. The complaint in such cases must b£ 
verified. (C. L. 17, § 7335§ 
S. L. R. Co., 23vtf. « § , Venue—Postal Tel Cable Co. v. O. 
65 P . 735. 
104-61-7. Complaint—Contents. 
The complaint must contain: 
(1) The name of the corporatiogf 
tion, commission or person in ctiaj 
public use for which the property 
who must be styled plaintiff. 
(2) The names of all owners anT 
of the property, if known, or a st~ 
they are unknown, who must bg"^  
fendants. 
(3) A statement of the right o 
tiff. 
(4) If a right of way is sou | 
plaint must show its location, geig 
termini, and must be accompany 
thereof, so far as the same is i? 
action or proceeding. 
(5) A description of eaclT 
sought to be taken, and whetl^ 
eludes the whole or only part $ 
eel or tract. All parcels ly% 
and required for the same p*| 
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104-61-2 Title 104—-Code of Civil Procedure [594] 
Places of historical interest, eminent do-
main to preserve, 59 A. L. R. 945. 
Public benefit or convenience as distin-
guished from use by the public as 
ground for exercise of eminent -do-
main, 54 A. L. R. 7. 
Right to condemn property in excess of 
needs for public purposes, 68 A. L. 
R. 837. 
State power of eminent domain as af-
fected by interstate (character of 
uses to which property taken is to be 
devoted, 90 A. L. R. 1082. 
mental projects for improvement of 
housing conditions (slum clear-
ance), 105 A. L. R. 911. 
Exercise of eminent domain for purpose 
of increasing right or interest which 
Setitioner already owns or relieving tie property or petitioner of some 
burden or obligation in respect of 
property, 108 A. L. R. 1522. 
Exercise of eminent domain for purpose 
of library, 66 A. L. R. 1496. 
Exercise of eminent domain for purposes 
of airport, 135 A. L. R. 755. 
Injunction against exercise of power of 
eminent domain, 133 A. L. R. 11. 
104-61-2. Estates and Rights that May Be Taken. 
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands 
subject to be taken for public use: 
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for 
permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams and permanent flooding 
occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the de-
posit, of debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the 
reduction of ores; provided, that where surface ground is underlaid 
with minerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify 
extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface 
ground over such deposits. 
(2) An easement, when taken for any other use, 
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, with the 
right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as 
may be necessary for some public use; (L. 19, p. 346, § 7331.) 
Codes, § 9935 (substantially identical, 
except that subd. 1 concludes with 
words: " * * * or tailings of a 
mine"). 
History. 
This section differs materially from 2 
Comp. Laws 1888, § 3842. Other prede-
cessor sections, see R. S. 1898, §3689; 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 3589, 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, §1239 (classi-
fies estates and rights in lands subject 
to be taken for a public use; subd. 1 is 
identical through the words "tailings of 
a mine"; pertains also to protection of 
water bearing lands from drought, and 
to taking of property by mutual water 
system or water district or other pol-
itical subdivision; subd. 2 includes iden-
tical provision as herein, but is coupled 
with lengthy proviso; subd. 8 is substan-
tially identical with subd. 3 herein). 
Idaho Code, § 13-702, Mont. Rev. 
104-61-3. Private Property Which May Be Taken. 
The private property which may be taken under this chapter in-
cludes: 
(1) All real property belonging to any person. 
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorpo-
rated town, not appropriated to some public use. 
1. Easements. 
In proceeding to condemn easement in 
land for laying of gas pipe line, taking 
of easement was held not to constitute 
taking of fee. Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bou-
whuis, 82 U. 673, 26 P.2d 648. 
One easement may be superimposed on 
another easement through condemnation.. 
Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Rexall 
Consol. Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. 
Right to run water through defend-
ants' irrigation canal might be con-
demned, although defendants had only 
easement. Whiterocks Irr . Co. v. Moose-
man, 46 U. 79, 141 P. 459. 
[595] Title 104—Code of Civil Procedure 104-61-3 
(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such prop-
erty shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than 
that to which it has been already appropriated. 
(4) Franchises for toil roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other fran-
chises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for 
free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use. 
(5) All rights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in section 
104-61-1, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and 
the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be 
connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or im-
provement or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited 
use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such 
uses of crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the 
manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least 
private injury. 
"(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for 
public use when such taking is authorized by law. (C. L. 17, § 7332.) 
History. 
This section is practically identical 
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3848. Other 
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898, 
§ 3690; Comp. Laws 1907, § 3690. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1240 (desig-
nating private property which may be 
taken under title pertaining to Eminent 
Domain). 
Idaho Code, § 13-703, Mont. Rev. 
Codes, § 9936 (substantially the same). 
Cross-references. 
Property and franchises of private 
corporations subject to eminent domain, 
Const. Art. XII, § 11. 
1. Public lands. 
Under Const. Art. I l l , § 2, and section 
3 of Enabling Act, by which the people 
forever disclaimed all right and title to 
unappropriated public lands lying within 
boundaries thereof, public lands are not 
subject to state power of eminent domain 
either directly or indirectly, without con-
sent of United States. Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States, 230 F. 328, 
337, 4 A. L. R. 635. 
2. Land granted by Congress for rail-
road rights of way. 
Under subdivision (6), sxiflteient 
ground for a tipple site may be con-
demned, but a coal company cannot con* 
demn any portion of a right of way, used 
for railroad purposes and granted by 
Congress, for a tipple site, regardless of 
how convenient that would be, and even 
though it would indirectly benefit the 
nublic. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 50 U. 395, 168 P. 86. 
3. Property appropriated to public use 
in general. 
Generally, property which is being 
held for or devoted to public use by one 
Eerson may not be taken by another to e used for same purpose and in the 
same manner. Utah Copper Co. v, 
Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 U. 645, 
31 P.2d 624. 
Property devoted to one public use 
may, under general statutory authority, 
be taken for another public use, where 
taking will not materially impair or in-
terfere with, or is not inconsistent with, 
USB already existing. Freeman Gulch 
Min. Co, v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 
F.2d 16. 
4. More necessary public use. __ 
Proceeding by power company to ob-
tain right to connect flume with city's 
canal for purpose of discharging water 
into it was not suit to condemn land be-
longing to city as it owned only easement 
over land, and hence it waB not neces-
sary to show that use by power company 
was more necessary public use than that 
by city. Salt Lake City Water & Elec-
trical Power Co. v. Salt Lake City, 26 
U. 441, 71 P. 1067. 
Land, which is part of railroad's right 
of way but is not used for any purpose 
and is not essential to enjoyment of rail-
road's franchise and property, may be 
appropriated to use of duly incorporated 
telegraph company for purpose of con-
structing and maintaining its lines, since 
such appropriation is for more necessary 
public use. Postal Tel. Cable Co. of 
Utah v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 23 U. 
474, 66 P. 735, 90 Am. St. Rep. 705. 
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5. Joint use or use in common. 
Where tunnel was not used by owner 
and possessor thereof to its full cap-
acity, right to joint use of tunnel could 
be condemned upon proper compensation 
being made to owner. Monetaire Mln. 
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consoi. Mines 
Co.. 53 U. 413, 174 P. 172. (Corfman 
and McCarty, JJ., dissenting.) 
Subdivision (5) limits the interference 
with rights of way to "crossings, inter-
sections, and connections" by other 
rights of way, and also makes a right 
of way subject "to a limited use in com-
mon with the owners thereof," although 
such use is clearly and manifestly a 
use for which the original right of way 
was obtained and is being used, and no 
other. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleasant 
Valley Coal Co., 60 U. 895, 168 P. 86. 
Proceeding by city against irrigation 
company to obtain right to enlarge ir-
rigating canal owned by defendant BO 
as to convey water from river for use 
of its inhabitants was controlled by 
principles involved in exercise of right 
of eminent domain. Salt Lake City v. 
East Jordan Irr. Co., 40 U. 126, 121 P. 
6. Interest in land of person contract-
ing to purchase from Htate. 
In proceedings by city to condemn 
against one in possession of land under 
contract to purchase from state title to 
which was in United States, where pend-
ing the proceedings defendant In pos-
session assigned his right in land to cor-
poration of which he was president and 
director, which received patent therefor 
from state and was afterwards made 
party to proceedings, held original de-
fendant had interest in land when pro-
ceedings were commenced which was 
subject to condemnation and was same 
interest which passed to defendant cor-
poration and ripened into title relating 
back to contract of sale by state. Brig-
ham City v. Rich, 34 U. 130, 96 P. 220. 
7. Effect, on rights of owner, of con-
demnation of easement. 
Use of land condemned for railroad 
right of way for exclusive use perma-
nent in its nature precludes owner from 
entering on or UBing any part of land, 
except by condemnor's consent, or un-
less statute or court limits easement by 
reserving certain rights to owner. Bing-
ham & G. Ry. Co. v. North Utah Min. 
Co. of Bingham, 49 U. 125,' 162 P. 65. 
A. L. R. noteB. 
Capital stock of public utility, condem-
nation. 81 A. L. R. 1071. 
Dower rights, condemnation, B A. L. R. 
1847. 
Property previously condemned or pur-
chased for public use but not actu-
ally so used, right to condemn, 12 
A. L. R. 1502. 
Property to be exchanged for other 
property required for public use, 
power to condemn, 68 A. L. R. 442. 
Public property, taking for another pub-
lic purpose, right to compensation, 
56 A.- L R. 365. 
Right of municipality or other govern-
mental body seeking to acquire pub-
lic utility to proceed in the manner 
prescribed generally for exercise of 
eminent domain, 109 A. L. R. 384. 
Right to take property under eminent 
domain as affected by fact that 
property is already devoted to ceme-
tery purposes, 109 A. L. R. 150Z. 
State power of eminent domain over 
property of United States, 4 A. L. 
104-61-4. Conditions Precedent to Taking. 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by 
law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; and, 
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use 
to which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use, 
(C. L. 17, § 7338.) 
History. 
This section is practically identical 
with 2 Comp. LaWB 1888, § 3844. Other 
Sredecessor sections, see R. S. 1898, 3591; Comp. LawB 1907, §3591. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, § 1241 (subd. 1 
is identical with Bubd. 1 herein; subds. 
2 and 3 are prefaced with language 
identical with subds. 2 and 3, respect-
ively, herein, but are coupled with 
lengthy provisos). 
Idaho Code, § 13-704 (identical). 
Mont. Rev. Codes, §9937 (identical, 
except that Bubd. 3 is coupled with pro-
vision specifying that appeal to supreme 
court is permissible from finding or judgment, but such appeal does not stay 
further proceedings under this chapter). 
[597] Title 104—Code of Civil Procedure 104-61-7 
1. More necessary public use. 
Proceeding by power company to ob-
tain right to connect flume with city's 
canal for purpose of discharging water 
into it was not suit to condemn land 
belonging to city as it owned only ease-
ment over land, and hence it WBB not 
necessary to show that use by power 
company was more necessary public use 
than that by city. Salt Lake City Water 
& Electrical Power Co. 
City, 26 U. 441, 71 P. 1067. 
Salt Lake 
A. L. R. notes. 
Necessity of taking particular prop-
erty for drainage purposes as affecting 
exercise of eminent domain, 65 A. L. 
R. 604; property previously condemned 
or purchased for public use but not ac-
tually so used, right to condemn, 12 A. 
L. R. 1502; right to condemn property 
in excess of needs for public purposes, 
68 A. L. R. 837; right to take property 
under eminent domain as affected by 
fact that property is already devoted to 
"cemetery purposes, 109 A. L. R. 1602. 
104-61-5. Right of Entry for Survey, etc. 
In all cases where land is required for public use, the person, or his 
agent, in charge of such use may survey and locate the same; but it 
must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the 
greatest public good and the least private injury, and subject to the 
provisions of this chapter. The person, or his agent, in .charge of such 
public use may enter upon the land and make examinations, surveys 
and maps thereof, and such entry shall constitute no cause of action in 
favor of the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting from 
negligence, wantonness or malice. 
History. . 
This section is practically identical 
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3845. Other 
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898, § 3592; Comp. LawB 1907, § 3592. 
(C. L. 17, § 7334.) 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code, §1242, Idaho 
Code, § 13-705, Mont. Rev. Codes, § 9938 (substantially identical, reading in part: 
*' * * * the state, or itB agents in 
charge of such UBS * * * " ) . 
104-61-6. Venue of Action—Complaint to Be Verified. 
All proceedings Under this chapter must be brought in the district 
court for the county in which the property or some part thereof is situ-
ated. The complaint in such cases must be verified. (C. L. 17, § 7835.) 
History. , , 
This section is practically identical 
with 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 3846. Other 
predecessor sections, see R. S. 1898, | 3693; Comp. Laws 1907, § 3593. 
Comparable provisions. 
Cal. Civil Proc. Code. § 1243 (includes 
Srovision similar to firBt sentence herein; eBignating "superior court"). 
Idaho Code, §13-706 (similar to first 
sentence herein; " * * * for the county 
in which the property is Bituated"). 
Mont. Rev. Codes, § 9939, as amended 
by Laws of 1987 (includes provision 
identical with first sentence herein). 
1. Constitutionality. 
This section does not conflict with 
ConBt. Art, VIII, § 5, so as to preclude 
telegraph company from bringing ac-
tion to condemn railroad's right of way, 
which extends through several counties, 
for construction of its lines, in one of 
such counties. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. 
Oregon Short Line R. Co., 23 U. 474, 
65 P. 736, 90 Am. St. Rep, 705. 
104-61-7. Complaint—Contents.. 
The complaint must contain: 
(1) The name of the corporation, association, commission or person 
in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must 
be styled plaintiff. 
(2) The names of all owners and claimants of the property, if 
known, or a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled de-
fendants. 
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'51 Supp. Title 104—Judicial Code 104-34-3 
ndeinner and the owner of land within said limit and providing for 
e operation of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of 
e^g; nor until an action shall have been commenced to restrain the 
^ration of such mill, smelter or other works for the reduction of ores. 
Construction and application of sec-
tion. 
— irrigation. 
/Under Const. Art. I, § 22, and 1&-7-4, 
Tier of water right is entitled to: just 
^npensation for rights taken; he is en-
led to have value of his land considered 
connection with his water : - right, jtnird City v. State, 105 U. 278, 288, 
^P.2d 154, 158. 
— extra-territorial powers of con-
demnation. 
J This section does not, by implication, 
infer extra-territorial powers of con-
emnation upon boards of education, 
ertagnoli v. Baker, — U. —, 215 P.2d 
In proceedings for an alternative writ 
prohibition directing court, judges 
hereof, and school board, to refrain 
* om any further proceedings in condem-
nation action, enactment of 75-11-26 by 
legislature led to conclusion that legis-
lature, by its silence in this section and 
5-11-20, both of which were enacted 
rior to 75-11-26, did not intend to im-
pliedly confer extra-territorial powers 
of condemnation upon boards of educa-
tion. Bertagnoli v. Baker, —• U. —, 215 
P.2d 626. . . ' . . . . ' 
4. —water system of public utility. 
By the terms of former 104-61-1 and 
15-7-4, town of North Salt Lake had 
authority to condemn water system for 
use of its inhabitants even though prop-
erty belonged to company which was fur-
nishing public service. North Salt Lake 
v. St. Joseph Water & Irr. Co., — U. —, 
223 P.2d 577. 
A. L. R. notes. 
Compensation for, or extent of rights ac-
quired by, taking of land, as affected 
by condemnor's promissory state-
ments as to character of use or un-
dertakings to be performed by it, 7 
A. L. R. 2d 1407. 
Condemnation of materials for highway 
or other public, or quasi-public 
works, 172 A. L. R. 131. 
Condemnation of public utility property 
for public utility purposes, 173 A. 
L. R. 1362. 
^4-34-2. Estates and Rights that May be Taken. 
The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands sub-
ject to be taken for public use: 
(1) A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds or for 
aanent buildings, for res^voirs and dams and permanent flooding 
,. asioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit 
f debris or tailings of a mine, mill, smelter or other place for the reduc-|oxi of ores; provided that where surface ground is underlaid with 
^aerals, coal or other deposits sufficiently valuable to justify extrac-
M, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface ground 
e^r such deposits. 
(2) An easement, when taken for any other use. 
(3) The right of entry upon, and occupation of, lands, with the right 
*take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees and timber as may be 
essary for some public use. 
-4-34-3. Private Property Which May Be Taken. 
The private property which may be taken under this chapter includes: 
(1) All real property belonging to any person. 
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorpo-
;^d town, not appropriated to some public use. 
,(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such prop-
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that 
^hich it has been already appropriated. 
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M; :H 104-34-4 Title 104—Judicial Code Votl 
(4) Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges* ferries, and all other • 
chises; provided, tha t such franchises shall not be taken unless fo / f^I 
highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use. *^_ 
• (5) All r ights of way for any and all purposes mentioned in sectio 1 3 
hereof, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and fl! 4 ^ 
lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be c 4'l§ 
nected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or imprn°^ ?L 
ment or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited use ^A 
common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses ^ t ^ 
crossings, intersections and connections shall be made in the mannS 3H 
most.compatible with the greatest public benefit a,nd the least privatS ^ 
injury. • . «• " -Jf&ia 
(6) Allclasses of private property not enumerated may be taken j l jP l i 
public use when such taking is authorized by law. J ^ 
A. L. R. notes. ., condemnation, of real property noiPt 
Retention, by building or other fixture, .withstanding agreement treating ^W 
.... of; its character as real property, . as. personalty,. 151 A. L. R.142^-Sjt 
.for purposes of statute authorizing " •;. 'n*%i 
104-34-4. Conditions Precedent to T a k i n g W\ 
Before property can be taken it must a.ppp^r: . V . . 
(1) That the use to which i t is to Jbe applied is a use authorized ^ | | 
law; • V;.r;_;.;\. • :?ffk 
(2) That the taking is necessary to siicKjiSe; and, . : ^ 
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, tha t the public use4|^ 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. <f§ 
104-34-5; Right of En t ry f6r Stitveyy ^ etci: r-^ fit 
In all;ca,se$ where land is reqpired-fpr pjiblic!use, the person, or li 
agent* in charge pf such usemay^uryey anctlocate tjie same; but it m:| 
be located in the manner which yriU be.^pgt
 s cpi^ipatible with the greatg 
public good and the least private. .wj |^^\and/js\ i ibj .^_to%e provision 
Of this chapter. The person, or his agent, iii charge of such public w 
may enter upon the land : and .make examiiiatioiis, surveys and maj] 
thereof, and such entry shall^ constitiite.no cause of action in favors 
the owners of the lands, except for injuries resulting froih negligei^ 
wantonness or malice. .. , 
104-34-6. Complaint—Contents. 
The complaint must contain: 
(1) The name of the corporation, association, commission or P e r ?£ | 
in charge of the public itse for which the property is sought, who mi 
be styled plaintiff- < ^ ! .-••. 
(2) The names of all owners-and claimants of the property, if fof 
o r a statement tha t they are unknown, who must be styled d e f e n d 
(3) A statement of the r igh t of t he plaintiff. ^ .<:. 
(4) If a r ight of way is sought; t he complaint must show its tocat^ 
general route and termini* and must be accompanied by a map ther 
so far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding. 
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Chs. 57, 58 Judicial Code [150] 
beer as defined herein, properly completed, signed and filed as prescribed 
herein and any regulation issued by the governing authorities concern-
ing the issuance and use of said identification card, shall be prima facie 
evidence of good faith of any action brought against any store manager 
or his employees, any proprietor of a package agency or his employees, 
or any licensee to sell beer at retail or his employees for sale of liquor 
or beer, as the case may be, to any person signing such identification 
card. No holder of such identification card properly completed, signed 
and filed as in this act provided shall be prosecuted criminally or sued 
in any civil action for selling liquor or beer to a person under 21 years of 
age who has presented such identification card at the time of purchase 
and delivered same for filing as herein provided. 
Section 7. Misdemeanor—Penalty. 
Any person who shall make any false statement on the identification 
card provided for in this act to be signed by him, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor; on conviction thereof, shall be sentenced to pay a fine of 
not more than $100.00 or imprisonment for not more than thirty days 
or by both. 
Approved March 3, 1951. 
JUDICIAL CODE 
H. B. No. 31 Passed March 8, 1951. In efftct May 8, 1951. 
CHAPTER 58 
A COMPILATION 
An Act to Revise, Codify and Re-enact Into Law Under Title 104 all of 
Those Sections of Title 20, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Known as 
"Courts," and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 1943, Known as the 
"Code of Civil Procedure/* and all Subsequent Acts Amendatory 
Thereof or Supplemental Thereto, Including Chapters 18, 19, 20, 21, 
33, 34, 35, 36 Laws of Utah 1943; Chapters 25, 26, 39 and 40, Laws 
of Utah 1945; Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11 and 31, Laws of Utah 1947, and 
Chapters 17, 26 and 76, Laws of Utah 1949, Which Have Not Been 
Superseded by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as Adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Utah, Said New Enactment to be Known as "The 
Judicial Code"; Also Adding Thereto Necessary Sections to Carry 
Into Effect Said Enactment Without Affecting Existing Rights or 
Obligations; Also Repealing Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1943, As Amended, and Chapters 19, 33 and 34, Laws of Utah 
1943; Chapters 8 and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and Chapter 76, Laws 
of Utah 1949. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Title 20 and Title 104, Utah Code Annotated 1943, as 
[151] Judicial Code Ch. 58 
amended, and Chapters 19, 38 and 34, Laws of Utah 1943; Chapters 8 
and 10, Laws of Utah 1947; and Chapter 76, Laws of Utah 1949, 
insofar as the same have not been superseded by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure as adopted by the Supreme Court of Utah, are hereby 
revised, codified and re-enacted into law as "The Judicial Code" under 
Title 104, as follows: 
TITLE 104 
JUDICIAL CODE 
PART I. COURTS 
CHAPTER 1. ENUMERATION 
104-1-1. Courts of Justice Enumerated. 
The following are the courts of justice of this state: 
(1) The senate sitting as court of impeachment. 
(2) The Supreme court. 
(3) The district courts. 
(4) The city courts. 
(5) The juvenile courts. 
(6) Justices' courts. 
104-1-2. Courts of Record Enumerated. 
The courts enumerated in the first five subdivisions of the preceding 
section are courts of record. 
CHAPTER 2. SUPREME COURT 
104-2-1. Number of Justices—Quorum—Term. 
The supreme court shall consist of five justices, three of whom shall 
constitute a quorum to hold court or render a decision, but one alone 
may adjourn from day to day. The term of office of a justice of the 
supreme court shall be ten years and until his successor is elected and 
qualified. 
104-2-2. Jurisdiction—Original and Appellate. 
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of 
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus. 
Each of the justices shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to 
any part of the state, upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in 
actual custody, and may make such writs returnable before himself or 
the supreme court, or before any district court or judge thereof. In 
other cases the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction only; 
and, in the exercise of such appellate jurisdiction, may review all final 
judgments of the district court, and all final orders and decrees of the 
district court in the administration of decedents' estates and in matters 
of guardianship, and shall have power to issue writs necessary and 
proper for the exercise of that jurisdiction. In equity cases the appeal 
may be.on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal 
shall be on questions of law alone. 
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78-34-3 JUDICIAL CODE 
Monetaire Min. Co. v. Columbus Eexall of easement was held not to constitute 
Consol. Mines Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P, 172, taking of fee. Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bou-
In proceeding to condemn easement in whuis, 82 U. 573, 26 P . 2d 548. 
land for laying of gas pipe line, taking 
78-34-3. Private property which may be taken.—The private property 
which may be taken under this chapter includes: 
(1) All real property belonging to any person. 
(2) Lands belonging to the state, or to any county, city or incorporated 
town, not appropriated to some public use. 
(3) Property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property 
shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to 
which it has been already appropriated. 
(4)' Franchises for toll roads, toll bridges, ferries, and all other 
franchises; provided, that such franchises shall not be taken unless for 
free highways, railroads, or other more necessary public use. 
(5) Air rights-of-way for any and all purposes mentioned in section 
78-34-1 hereof, and any and all structures and improvements thereon, and 
the lands held or used in connection therewith, shall be subject t.o be 
connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right-of-way. or 
improvement or structure thereon; they shall also be subject to a limited 
use in common with the owners thereof, when necessary; but such uses 
of crossings, intersections and connections shall, be made in the manner 
most compatible with the greatest public benefit and the least private 
injury. 
(6) All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for 
public use when such taking is authorized by law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, § 1; C. 1943, Capital stock of public utility, condem-
Supp., 104-34-3. nation, 81 A. L. B. 1071. 
Dower rights, condemnation, 5 A. L. K. 
Compiler's Notes. 1347. 
This section is substantially the same ^ P 6 * * P r £ ? o u s ^ ™?demfnQe* ° ' *™' 
1
, "
 n4.i^ i n / l R 1 o //indA iQ4<n chased for public use but not actually so 
as former ^ ^ J 0 ^ 1 ' * < ° 0 ! ^
 n
1 9 4
° >
 d rf h t * , condemn, 12 A. L. B. 1502. 
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. p r ' o p e * t y t o b e exchanged for other 
The reference in this section to " s e c P'opertv required for public use, power 
tion 78-34-1" appeared in the act as ^ ^ t ^ ^ 9 \ ^ t , another 
section l . public purpose, r ight to compensation, 56 
Comparable* ^ v i M o n s . % e t J t l o n ? by building or other fixture, 
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Oode, & ±<av
 o £ i t g character a s r e a i property, for pur-
(designating private property which may
 g o f g t a t u t e authorizing condemnation 
be taken under t i t le pertaining to Emm-
 o f r e a l p r o p e r t y | notwithstanding agrce-
ent Domain).
 m e l l t t reat ing it as personalty, 151 A. L. 
Idaho Code 1947, §7-703; Mont. Bev.
 R U 2 9 
Codes 1947, § 93-9904 (substantially the 'Right of municipality or other govern-
same). mental body 'seeking to acquire public 
utility to proceed in the manner pre-
Cross-Reference. scribed generally for exercise of eminent 
Property and franchises of private cor- domain, 109 A, L. B. 384. 
porations subject to eminent domain, Bight to take property under eminent 
Const. Art. XII , § 11. domain as affected by fact that property is already devoted to cemetery purposes, Collateral References. 109 A. L. B, 1502. 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
DECISIONS TINDER FOBMEB LAW 
1. Public lands. 
Under Const. Art . H I , § 2, and section 
3 of Enabling Act, by which the people 
forever disclaimed all right and ti t le to 
unappropriated public lands lying within 
boundaries thereof, public lands are not 
subject to s tate power of eminent domain 
either directly or indirectly, without con-
sent of United States. Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States, 230 F . 328, 
337. 4 A. L. B. 535. 
2. Land granted by Congress for rail-
road rights-of-way. 
Under subdivision (5), sufficient ground 
for a tipple site may be condemned, but 
a coal company cannot condemn any por-
tion of a right-of-way, used for railroad 
purposes and granted by Congress, for 
a tipple site, regardless of how convenient 
tha t would be, and even though it would 
indirectly benefit the public. Ketchum 
Coal Co. v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 50 
U. 395, 168 P . 86. 
3. Property appropriated to public use 
in general. 
Property devoted to one public use 
may, under general statutory authority, 
be taken for another public use, where 
taking will not materially impair or in-
terfere with, or is not inconsistent with, 
use already existing. Freeman G-ulch Min. 
Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 F . 
2d 16. 
Generally, property which is being held 
for or devoted to public use by one per-
son may not be taken by another to be 
used for same purpose and in the same 
manner. Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen 
Hayes Estate , Inc., 83 U. 546, 31 P . 2d 
624. 
4. Necessity for public use. 
Land, which is par t of railroad's right-
of-way but is not used for any purpose 
and is not essential to enjoyment of rail-
road's franchise and property, may be 
appropriated to use of duly incorporated 
telegraph company for purpose of con-
structing and maintaining its lines, since 
such appropriation is for more necessary 
public use. Postal Tel, Cable Co. of Utah 
v. Oregon Short Line B. Co., 23 U. 474, 
65 P . 735, 90 Am. St. Bep. 705. .,': 
Proceeding by power company to ob-
tain right to connect flume with city's 
canal for purpose of discharging water 
into i t was not suit to condemn land be-
longing to city as i t owned only easement 
over land, and hence it was not neces-
BOTV +n n h n w flint. TIHP htr -nnwAT nnm-nartxr 
trical Power Co. v. Sa 
U. 441, 71 P . 1067. 
5. Joint or use in conn 
Proceeding by city i 
company to obtain righ 
gating canal owned by 
to convey water from ri 
inhabitants was control 
involved in exercise of 
domain. Salt Lake Cit 
Irr . Co., 40 U. 126, 12* 
Subdivision (5) limit 
with rights-of-way to 
sections, and connection! 
of-way, and also mak< 
subject "to a limited us 
the owners thereof," alt 
clearly and manifestly 
the original right-of-w 
and is being used, and » 
Coal Co. v. Pleasant V 
U. 395, 168 P . 86, 
Where tunnel was n< 
and possessor thereof 
acity, right to joint us 
be condemned upon pri 
being made to owner. 
Co. v. Columbus Bexi 
Co., 53 U. 413, 174 P . 1 
McCarty, JJ , , dissentin 
6. Interest in land of 
to purchase from 
In proceedings by 
against one in possesBi 
contract to purchase f] 
which was in United S 
ing the proceedings de: 
sion assigned his right ] 
tion of which he was p: 
tor, which received pat 
state and was afterwai 
proceedings, held origii 
interest in land when 
commenced which was 
demnation and was sa: 
passed to defendant 
ripened into title relal 
t rac t of sale by state. 
Bich, 34 U. 130, 96 P 
7. Effect, on rights 0 
demnation of eai 
Use of land conden 
right-of-way for exch 
nent in its nature prec 
entering on or using i 
except by condemnor's 
statute or court limits 
serving certain rightB t< 
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78-34-4 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-34-4, Conditions precedent to taking.—Before property can be taken 
it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law ; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such usej and, 
(3) If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use to 
which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; O. 1943, 
Supp., 104-34-4. 
Compiler's Note, 
This section is substantially the same 
as former section 104-61-4 (Code 1943) 
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 
58, §3 . 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Civ. Proc. Code, § 1241 
(subd. 1 is identical with Bubd. 1 herein; 
subds. 2 and 3 are prefaced with language 
identical with subds, 2 and 3, respective-
ly, herein, but are coupled with lengthy 
provisos). 
Idaho Code 1947, §7-704 (identical). 
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §93-9905 
(identical, except t ha t subd. 3 is coupled 
with provision specifying tha t appeal to 
Supreme Court is permissible from find-
ing or judgment, but such appeal does 
not stay further proceedings under this 
chapter) . 
Collateral References. 
Eminent Domain<S=>13. 
29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 29. 
Conditions precedent, 18 Am. Jur , 961, 
Eminent Domain § 317 et seq. 
Necessity of tak ing part icular prop-
erty for drainage purposes as affecting 
exercise of eminent domain, 65 A. L. K. 
504. 
Property previously condemned or pur-
chased for public use but not actually 
so used, right to condemn, 12 A. L. R, 
1502. 
Right to condemn property in excess 
of needs for public purposes, 68 A. L. R. 
837. 
Right to take property under eminent 
domain as affected by fact tha t -proper ty 
is already devoted to cemetery purposes, 
109 A. L. R. 1502. 
'DECISION UNDER FORMER LAW 
1, More necessary public use, 
Proceeding by power company to ob 
tain right to connect flume with city's 
canal for purpose of discharging water 
into it was not suit to condemn land 
belonging to city as i t owned only ease-
ment over land, and hence i t was not 
necessary to show tha t use by power 
company was more necessary public use 
than that by city. Salt Lake City Water 
& Electrical Power Co. v. Salt Lake 
City, 25 TJ. 441, 71 P . 1067. 
78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location.—In all cases where 
land is required for public use, the person, or his agent, in charge of 
such use may survey and locate the same; but it must be located in the 
manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and 
the least private injury, and subject to the provisions of this chapter. 
The person, or his agent, in charge of such public use may enter upon 
the land and make examinations, surveys and maps thereof, and such 
entry shall constitute no cause of action in favor of the owners of the 
lands, except for injuries resulting from negligence, wantonness or malice. 
History: L. 1&51, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943, Idaho Code 1947, §7-705; Mont. Rev. 
Supp., 104-34-5. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is substantially the same 
Codes 1947, § 93-9906 (substantially iden-
tical, reading in pa r t : "* * * the state, 
or i ts agents in charge of such 
use 
as former section 104-61-5 (Code 1943) 
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. 
58, § 3 . 
"). 
Collateral References. 
Eminent Domain<S=>186. 
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Trans. 
property t ha t has not been devoted by law to a 
public use. 
By the Court: The objection is overruled 
Exception. 
A. There is very little of the property ad-
joining ours between these points under cultiva-
tion, and along a great, majority of i t it is public 
land, and there is a wagon road between the two 
points practically parallel to our right of way 
and not very far away at any place. 
Q. A t any portion of this road over this 
route, you may state if you know whether or not 
the wagon road or highway or the railroad is the 
more, direct, as, for instance, toward the north-
ern end? 
A. As a. whole proposition, I think the 
wia.gon road is the shorter; I . know it is in a 
gre»at many places. 
Q. Can you refer to any particular locality 
in which there is an economy of distance by 
the wagon road? , 
A. For a distance of thirty miles south of 
the Montana line, about three or four miles, 
three miles, at least, would be saved by going 
across the mountain by the wagon- road. 
Q. The railroad there makes detours, then, 
for some reason. Why is tha t? 
^ 
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A. For the purpose of supporting a uni-
form, grade. 
Q. I will ask you to state, Mr. Calvin, from 
your experience and observation and knowledge • 
of such matters , and from the description of the 
proposed line of telegraph poles tha t you. heard 
here in Court this morning, and tha t is described 
in the petition, whether it would be an interfer-
ence and annoyance and an added danger, in / 
your opinion, to the operation of the railroad, 
to have such a line erected as it is proposed to 
erect it, at a distance of thirty feet from the 
railroad t rack? 
By Mr. Powers: I object to the question 
as incompetent, calling for conclusions and opin-
ions upon a hypothetical s tatement t h a t it is 
altogether too indefinite; the opinions sought 
would be of no value. 
Overruled. Exception. 
A. Certainly. . • , 
Q. How much, in your opinion, if you are 
able to give one, would the right of way, or the 
value of the right of way of the railroad, be im-
paired or lessened in value by the presence of a 
line of telegraph as proposed, as compared with 
its value for railroad purposes, without such 
construction? 
By Mr. Powers: The question'of damages 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
102 
Trans. 
Page. 
is not at issue in this ease, and this testimony is 
therefore incompetent, .immaterial and irrele-
vant. 
By the Court: Objection is overruled. 
Exception. 
By Mr. Powers: And let the objection 
stand to any testimony upon these questions, so 
I need, not renew it. 
A. I should say it should not be done at 
all. But the damage would be not less than 
|200 per mile; there are other contingencies tha t 
Q. I wish you would state, Mr. Calvin, 
some of the reasons and as many as may occur 
to you, briefly, upon which you base this opinion 
and judgment, and the objection which you find 
to such.construction? 
A. We burn off our right of way once a 
year. At such times it is necessary to have a 
force of men on hand to prevent, the burning of 
telegraph poles and right of way fence posts. 
I t is necessary to have a force of men on hand 
to travel -with the fire and be stationed at each 
telegraph pole to beat it out. Wi th another 
line tha t expense would be doubled. We have 
accidents which make it necessary to move 
poles. We have accidents which knock poles 
down. We have fires tha t are set by accident 
when there is no one around, which would burn 
103 
up such property. We are now engaged in wid-
ening the embankment of our roadbed through 
this portion of the line tha t is in controversy. I t 
will not all be done this year, but it is all pro-
vided for in our appropriation for the immedi-
ate future for a large portion of the district, t ha t 
would be covered by this line. There is no soil 
excepting pockets in the lava. W e have to scrape 
around for a distance of three or four hundred 
feet from the track on each side in order to get 
sufficient material to accomplish that . The fur-
ther we haul tha t material the more we have to 
pay for it. If a telegraph line or anything else 
intervenes, it means added distance. Then there 
is an element of danger; the poles and wires be-
ing blown on to the track and material of tha t 
kind being left lying on the right of way, which 
is liable to cause personal injury. 
Q. Do you know of any other reason at 
this time? You may state whether or not, in 
your opinion, the presence, from time to time 
and at all times, of the material t ha t might be 
necessary t ^ the employees of such a company 
in maintaining a line there, left at their pleas-
ure and convenience upon the right of way, 
would, in your opinion, be,a liability of result-
ing in additional danger, in the operation of a 
railroad safely? 
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A. Without, doubt. Then another item of 
added expense would be tha t if this line, as pro-
posed, be placed thir ty feet from the track, it 
would fill a large portion of the territory inside 
of our line, where we run along a stream, where 
it would be impracticable to place it on the 
opposite side. In case of our stringing addi-
tional wires, which is necessary from t ime to 
t ime, we couldn't, under these circumstances, 
handle the wire from the track on account of the 
interevning pole lines. I t would be necessary to 
put. i t on wagons and haul i t over the country 
for s tr inging it. On portions of this.road, it 
would be an absolute necessity to place both of 
those lines on the same side of the track, for the 
reason t h a t the road runs along streams where 
it is impracticable to get on the other side, and 
certainly impossible without getting too close to 
the track. Under such conditions wliere it be-
comes necessary for us to string another wire, 
we couldn't handle that wire from a car on the 
track, as is our practice, but it would be neces-
sary to haul it in a wagon on the other side of 
the pole line. 
Q. You speak of accidents, wrecks, etc., 
when i t becomes necessary, sometimes, to re-
move the poles. I would be obliged if you would 
go a. l i t t le more into detail upon tha t subject, 
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the occasional wreck you speak of, which does 
occur now and them 
A. Well, it is necessary at almost every 
wreck tha t occurs along a railroad to string out 
rope a long distance in order to r ight up the cars 
and engines. There is what we call a "dead 
man" placed 25 or 50 feet on the opposite side 
of the t rack from the engine; we put up a block 
and tackle, at tach it to the "dead man" down 
the track and at tach it to an engine. And we 
very frequently are obliged to remove poles on 
t h a t account. 
Q. Under such circumstances would it be 
practicable in the speedy removal of wrecks to 
wait, the permission from another company to 
interfere with their poles where it becomes 
necessary on such occasions as you have indi-
cated? 
A. Certainly, no. 
Q. The clearing up o-f 'a. wreck and getting 
traffic started is something you work at every 
moment, is i t not, whether it is night or day? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. State whether you know whether or not 
there are objections, and the reason for the ob-
jection of telegraph wires across overhead of a 
railroad t rack? 
A. There are. We are arranging now for 
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all of our wires to go underground where tliey 
cross the track. We have done so in one case 
as an experiment, and are arranging now to 
make tha t the standard. 
Q. I will ask you now whether or not you 
have made estimates and orders for such cross-
ings? 
A. We have made requisitions for the re-
qui site m aterial. 
Q. You may state whether or not you 
know it is the design of the company ^ e x t e n d 
t h a t method hereafter, to renew the crossings 
and make new crossings, to resort to crossings 
underneath the track, instead of over? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What, are the objections to overhead 
crossings? jf 
A. The danger of sagging wires is the 
principal objection. When a wire becomes de-
tached, from the pole nearest the railroad, i t may 
drop down a long distance below where it was 
originally put ; and it may do tha t without being 
detached. 
Q. Where a wire becomes detached, the 
greater will be the sag? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you in your mind the length of 
road from Cannon to Monida? 
n' 
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A. 202 miles. 
Q. Are you able to state from your inspec-
tion of the surveys the distance in each of those 
four counties? 
A. I couldn't, give it exactly. I remember 
approximately the distance, but not exactly. 
CROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Mcintosh: 
Q. Wha t is the distance, Mr. Calvin, of the 
poles of the Western Union line, on your right of 
wiay, from the roadbed? 
A. Generally 50 feet, and in some places 
more than that . 
Q. Some places nearer, are they not? 
A. In a few places where the condition 
of the adjacent country make i t absolutely 
necessary. 
Q. Do you know the distance, the average 
distance, from the center of the track to the 
telegraph poles on the r ight of way of railroads 
through the country? 
A. In a general way, yes. 
Q. W h a t is it? 
A. I presume the average would be on the 
old lines perhaps thir ty feet, but on the new lines 
it is not less than fifty feet. 
Q. Well, where the r ight of way is only 
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